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This experimental research tested two motivational factors drawn from the heuristic 
processing model (Chaiken, 1980) to understand the role of message processing in the 
success of deceptive front groups. This research extended a series of applications of 
inoculation theory as a strategy to confer resistance to deceptive front group messages. 
Pfau et al. (2007) found inoculation produced resistance to front group attacks; however 
Robertson et al (2010) did not. Front groups often shift responsibility away from 
politicians or corporations, use vague arguments, and hide behind deceptive names. 
This research explored whether a standard inoculation message is sufficient to generate 
resistance to front groups’ messages or if an improved inoculation treatment called 
RAN (responsibility/arguments/names) inoculation is necessary. Potential differences in 
information-seeking behaviors between the standard, RAN, and control group using 
Camtasia software were explored. Finally, it was anticipated that individuals who 
receive inoculation treatments are more accurate at classifying front groups than 
controls. Participants were 226 students from the Communication research pool at the 
University of Oklahoma. MANOVA, multiple regression, and Chi-Square tests were 
employed to test the research hypotheses.  There were no differences between groups on 
the motivational variables or message processing, however the RAN treatments were 
superior to the standard inoculation treatments in that they produced more focused 
information-seeking behaviors. Overall, those in both inoculation conditions were more 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
Van O’Dell, a Vietnam veteran of the United States Navy earnestly faced 
the camera to tell the American public his side of the story.  “John Kerry lied to get 
his bronze star.  .  . I know, I was there, I saw what happened” (Swift Boat Veterans 
for Truth, 2004).  His remarks were aired in an advertisement called “Any 
questions?” which was funded by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT) 
(Factcheck.org, 2004).  Initially, the attacks against Kerry lodged by SBVT 
appeared to be accurate eyewitness testimony of the soldiers who had fought 
alongside John Kerry.  However upon further exploration of the Navy records, the 
seemingly honest testimony of betrayed veterans was later exposed as a deeply 
deceptive campaign (Factcheck.org).  Not only was their testimony revealed to be 
false but it was later found the SBVT was formed and funded not by a group of 
concerned veterans, but rather by the largest campaign contributor to the 
Republican Party in the state of Texas, Bob Perry (Factcheck.org).  Even 
Republican President George W. Bush, Senator Kerry’s direct opponent for the 
presidency publicly appealed to SBVT to stop the ads (Blitzer, 2004).  In the end, it 
became clear that SBVT was not a grassroots group but rather a front group, which 
Senator Kerry believes cost him the election (Joyner, 2006).   
 According to Fitzpatrick and Palenchar (2006) “Front groups are 
controversial public relations techniques used by organizations to influence public 
opinion and public policy on behalf of undisclosed special interests” (p. 203).  




because these groups are designed to appear separate or distinct from the 
corporations or political interest groups, whether conservative or liberal that 
supports them.  As a result they can advocate for corporate or policy outcomes that 
may be unpopular for the business or politicians to hold.  Front groups are designed 
to conceal their corporate and individual funders, which allow them to promote 
their interest while at the same time shielding those funders from public 
responsibility and scrutiny (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006).  Pfau, Haigh, Sims, and 
Wigley (2006) coined the term stealth campaigns to define the communication 
campaigns run by front groups.  In particular, they advance that “when front-groups 
engage in campaigns using names that deceive, they are engaged in stealth” (p. 1).  
Because front groups like SBVT are designed to appear as a legitimate grassroots 
movement simply trying to gain the attention of their elected representatives, these 
groups usually have “noble sounding names, such as “Citizens for [Something 
Good]” (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006, p. 203). However in reality, front groups 
like SBVT are artificial or manufactured grassroots movements.  The artificiality of 
these groups lead former United States Senator Lloyd Bentson to call them 
“Astroturf” (Young, 2009).   
There is more to a front group than clever names and the funders they 
carefully conceal.  Front groups are created to push both conservative and liberal 
political agendas (Isikoff, 2010) regardless of how many or how few people 
actually support their position on the issues (Young, 2009).  While their political or 




messages, which are deceptive, persuasive; clandestinely muddy the water, and 
thwart citizens’, consumers’, and politicians’ ability to consider all relevant 
information as they attempt to make sound decisions (Pfau et al., 2007).  For 
example, one front group, the Center for Consumer Freedom, outwardly portrays 
itself as a consumer advocacy group promoting positive choices such as healthy 
food options for children, but lobbies behind the scenes to allow restaurants and 
beverage companies to continue to distribute unhealthy foods (Rosenblum, 2007 
par. 3).   
Another front group, the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), 
is funded not by scientists or health professionals but rather by corporations such as 
Burger King, NutraSweet, and Exxon (Beder, 1998).  Rather than promoting 
healthier living through science, the ACSH designs stealth campaigns to make fast 
food sound healthy and pesticides like a panacea (Beder, 1998).  In this case as in 
many others, the name of the front group and their goals do not align.  While these 
examples demonstrate the cunning deception of front group stealth messages, they 
represent only a few of the front groups that have influenced public opinion and 
policy on important issues such as health, nutrition, and environmental resource 
management.   
 It should be noted that not all public relations practitioners employ the 
strategy of using front groups and stealth messages to achieve their goals.  In fact, 
the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) expressly condemns the use of 




not seem to stop some practitioners from forming front groups and launching 
stealth campaigns.  There was a time in which public relations practitioners were 
much more careful to craft messages that told some version of the truth.  Indeed, 
Gary McCormick, a past chair of PRSA, argues that while there are some instances 
in which public relations practitioners have taken great liberties with the truth, in 
general, they try to avoid deceptive campaigns (Sullivan, 2011).   
 Public relations practitioners have generally been careful to avoid 
dishonesty in their messages because getting caught is highly probable and puts 
their public image at risk.  They understood that whatever the public relations 
problem was before the lies were discovered would seem minor compared to the 
potential publicity crisis afterwards (Sullivan, 2011).  In short, public relations 
practitioners have generally been careful to tell the truth because they did not want 
to suffer the potential chaos of discovery.  Front groups changed the need for those 
who were only honest for fear of getting caught because corporate or individual 
funders of the front groups are carefully concealed.  Indeed, “front group backers 
perceive the rewards of winning as outweighing any potential risks” (Fitzpatrick & 
Palenchar, 2006, p. 221).   
 Not only have front groups emerged as a creative attempt to dupe the 
public, but the decline of newspapers and journalists have cut into the ability of the 
news media to hold these groups accountable (Sullivan, 2011).  Furthermore, front 
groups typically fall under “Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 




level” (Center for Public Integrity, 2008).  Current 527-group legislation also 
makes it extremely difficult for journalists to establish the links between the front 
groups and the individuals, businesses, organizations, political parties, and 
politicians who finance them (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; Sullivan, 2011).  
Indeed, according to Fitzpatrick and Palenchar (2006) 527-groups are not legally 
required to report publicly where their funding comes from.  Finally, as previously 
noted, while the PRSA specifically discourages its members from forming front-
groups, there are no specific requirements for members of PRSA to actually abide 
by the organization’s guidelines (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006).   
 Although it is difficult to track down how much money front groups have at 
their disposal, there is some evidence that some of these groups are very well 
funded (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; Sullivan, 2011).  For example, the liberal 
group, Patriot Majority invested $1.7 million in negative advertising against Harry 
Reid’s most recent challenger for Nevada’s Senate seat (Isikoff, 2010).  The key 
concern with Patriot Majority is that this group like many other front groups does 
not disclose information about their contributors (Isikoff, 2010).  Even if the groups 
do not have millions in their campaign coffers, they can still make a major impact 
on the outcome of a campaign.  As a case in point, according to Factcheck.org, the 
SBVT campaign only raised around $160,000.  Young (2009) contends these 
groups often have large budgets despite having a small list of supporters. So while 
it is not exactly clear just how much money these front groups are spending on both 




amount of money small or large has the potential to change election and policy 
outcomes (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; Sullivan, 2011).  Even without hard data 
about the stealth campaign coffers, front groups weigh in heavily with media 
blitzes to push their misleading and potentially harmful messages in as many 
outlets as possible (Sullivan, 2011).   
 Up until recently, there was a lot of anecdotal evidence that front groups 
were effective (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006); however, there was no empirical 
documentation of the efficacy of front group stealth.  To address this empirical gap, 
Pfau and colleagues (2007) designed an investigation to determine if front group 
stealth messages were indeed persuasive, how opinions about front groups and the 
companies that fund them change when their tactics are exposed, and whether 
individuals could be made resistant to front group stealth campaigns.  Pfau and 
colleagues grounded their justification for why front groups would likely be 
effective in the dual processing models of persuasion, the heuristic model of 
persuasion (Chaiken, 1980; 1987) and the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & 
Caccioppo, 1981, 1986).  They advanced that in many cases individuals are 
uninterested in politics or consumer issues and as a result they are not motivated to 
systematically process front group stealth messages and instead rely on simple cues 
like the pro-social sounding names of the groups.  While they did not test this 
explanation, they did find that front-group stealth campaigns were persuasive.   
In an effort to thwart the persuasiveness of front groups, Pfau and 




1961a, 1961b). Their theorizing was well warranted as a recent meta-analytic 
review conducted by Banas and Rains (2010) of 39 empirical investigations 
spanning over three decades of resistance research presents compelling evidence 
that the inoculation strategy is effective in a variety of contexts and is a better 
method for promoting resistance than simply reinforcing existing attitudes.  
Inoculation theory provides a theoretical account for the protection of attitudes built 
around the metaphor of a medial vaccination (McGuire, 1964). Inoculation scholars 
argue that the reason why inoculation effectively promotes resistance because the 
experimental treatments forewarn individuals that their existing attitudes are likely 
to come under attack and equips those individuals with arguments with which to 
respond to the challenges (McGuire, 1964; Compton & Pfau, 2004; Szabo & Pfau, 
2002). Because of the historical success of inoculation treatments (Banas & Rains, 
2010) it is also no surprise that Pfau and colleagues also found that inoculation 
promoted resistance to front group stealth.  
 In an effort to contribute additional depth to what is known about the 
influence of deceptive front groups, and to better understand how to prevent their 
deceptive tactics, Robertson, Pfau, Hansen, Averbeck, Kelley, and Eckstine (2010) 
conducted a second inquiry.  Robertson and colleagues suggested that in order to 
understand why front groups are persuasive, it is important to test the dual message 
processing explanation that Pfau and colleagues had originally suggested but did 
not test.  Opting for an application of the heuristic systematic processing model of 




engaged in heuristic processing would likely evaluate front groups with higher 
levels of authoritativeness and character, two dimensions of source credibility 
(McCroskey, 1966), than individuals who engaged in systematic processing.  Their 
predication was based on Pfau and colleagues’ (2007) argument that the reason 
front groups are successful is because people do not take the time to carefully 
scrutinize their motives, tactics, and the differences between the pro-social names 
of the groups and the actual messages.  Conversely, individuals who were highly 
involved with the issue featured by the front group message, may be more likely to 
systematically consider each one of these message features.  While Robertson and 
colleagues found a significant positive relationship between heuristic processing 
and ratings of front group credibility, they were disappointed to discover that there 
was a positive albeit non-significant relationship between systematic processing 
and ratings of front group source credibility.   
 To further explore the ability of inoculation to confer resistance to front 
group stealth messages, Robertson et al., (2010) proposed that if an individual was 
made aware of the tactics of one front group through exposure to the inoculation 
strategy, they should be resistant to the counterattitudinal attacks of that front group 
as well as the tactics of other front groups. This proposal was an exploration of 
Compton and Pfau’s admonition to explore the potential umbrella effect of 
inoculation or the ability of inoculation to promote resistance to the same issue 
addressed in the treatment as well as related but different ideas (2004).  




any of the front group stealth messages, making it impossible to conclude that a 
single inoculation message could foster resistance to a multitude of front group 
attacks.   
 These mixed results are peculiar given the inoculation messages and the 
attack messages employed in both studies were virtually identical as Robertson and 
colleagues attempted to replicate the research conducted by Pfau and colleagues 
(2007). The only difference between the messages in the two studies was that the 
standard inoculation messages designed for the Pfau et al. (2007) investigation 
were adapted by Robertson and colleagues to include more intense language 
designed to trigger anger in the participants (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994) in response 
to deceptive front-group messages than the standard inoculation messages.  Simply 
put, the original messages were coded as cognitive inoculation treatments and the 
adapted messages were coded as anger inoculation treatments.  Unfortunately, the 
results of the Robertson et al. (2010) individuals in both the cognitive inoculation 
and the anger inoculation group reported more anger than controls, but the anger-
based inoculation treatment did not generate significantly more anger than the 
cognitive inoculation messages.   
This finding reinforces the likelihood that participants perceived the 
inoculation messages to be very similar, and yet, the findings were different.  
Namely, Pfau and colleagues (2007) found that compared to control messages, the 
inoculation messages generated greater threat, counterarguing, and resistance to 




the inoculation messages generated more threat than the control groups, but did not 
have enough evidence to conclude that real differences existed between the level of 
counterarguing output and the level of resistance to stealth messages. 
 The purpose of this investigation is to explore and experimentally test 
possible explanations for the competing findings of Pfau et al. (2007) and 
Robertson et al. (2010). To this end, this research will present a more complete 
theoretical merger between the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) of persuasion 
and inoculation theory.  While Robertson and colleagues attempted to apply the 
HSM, they did not use the experimental procedures typically used in the HSM 
research, which may account for some of the unexpected results.  These 
methodological missteps prevented the true test of the merger between the heuristic 
model of persuasion and inoculation theory.   
The proposed theoretical linkages between the HSM and inoculation theory 
will likely produce several improvements that should equip individuals with the 
motivation and ability to identify front groups and to resist their deceptive stealth 
messages.  Central to the HSM is the motivation and ability to process messages 
(Chaiken, 1980).  This research will manipulate the participant’s level of accuracy 
motivation for processing both the inoculation messages and in the form of a 
motivational booster session prior to the attack messages drawing from HSM.  As 
with previous HSM studies, this investigation will assess both the participants’ 
level of desired confidence and their actual confidence that they could accurately 




opportunity to seek additional on-line information about front groups before they 
engage in the counterarguing session.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
participants who have a higher level of motivation, and who perceive a low level of 
confidence about their ability to identify front groups will engage in more focused 
information seeking about front groups than their less motivated colleagues.   
 Second, the HSM advances that there are times when people can be 
motivated to systematically process information, but when faced with ambiguous or 
conflicting information, heuristic cues are still influential (Todorov, Chaiken, & 
Henderson, 2002).  The present research suggests front group messages are by 
nature deceptive and ambiguous.  Therefore this investigation will add an 
additional inoculation message, referred to as a RAN inoculation message because 
it carefully details how front group shift responsibility, lack argument quality, and 
have misleading names.  This RAN inoculation message will follow the previous 
inoculation messages but will attempt to stimulate a higher level of motivation to 
identify whether a message originates from a front group and to identify 
questionable claims within a message and to stress the ambiguous nature of front 
group stealth messages.  It is reasonable to assume that the ambiguity of front 
group stealth messages might lead participants to draw on heuristic cues to process 
the messages.  However, with the additional motivation and training integrated into 
the new inoculation message, they may be more equipped to evaluate both the 
heuristic cues of front group messages such as the positive sounding names or the 




quality of the arguments presented together with the likelihood that the message 
may withhold important facts.   
The results of this research should be an important step toward 
understanding the theoretical linkages between the HSM and inoculation theory.  
These linkages are important because they may shed light on precisely why 
individuals are persuaded by front group stealth messages, but also if these reasons 
can be directly counteracted through inoculation treatments.  This investigation also 
has merit for applied research because it may determine what inoculation strategies 
can best promote resistance to deceptive front group stealth messages, which have 




Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
This chapter builds an evidentiary foundation to support why inoculation 
should promote resistance to front group stealth campaigns that advocate 
counterattitudinal positions.  Next, the two applications of inoculation to the 
context of front group stealth messages conducted by Pfau et al. (2007) and 
Robertson et al. (2010) will be explained in detail.  Then, extant theory and 
research from the heuristic-systematic processing model of persuasion (HSM) is 
explored in order to present theoretical improvements to inoculation theory that can 
equip inoculation to effectively counter front group stealth messages.   
Inoculation Theory 
 In the early 1950s and 60s, a time in which persuasion research and 
experimentation were well underway, very little scholarly research had been 
conducted on how individuals can be equipped to resist persuasion (McGuire, 
1964).  During this period, there was a considerable concern about the influence of 
enemy propaganda.  In particular, Szabo and Pfau (2002) advance that many 
American prisoners of the Korean War were unable to defend their original beliefs 
about the values of democracy and freedom because they had never considered the 
values of freedom and democracy to be disputable.  As a result, the prisoners were 
vulnerable to the enemy’s propaganda campaign (Szabo & Pfau, 2002).    
Building a Theory from a Medical Analogy 
Initially, the inoculation analogy was the product of a concerted effort to 




experiment in order to determine if one- or two-sided messages were more effective 
at promoting resistance to enemy propaganda attempts.  They found two-sided 
counterpropaganda, or messages that presented the recipients with both arguments 
to support their own position and possible challenges to that position, more 
effectively stabilized desired opinions than one-sided counterpropaganda messages, 
which only supported their position (Lumsdine & Janis, 1953).  The researchers 
concluded that the two-sided messages were superior to one-sided messages 
because when an individual is “given an advance basis for ignoring or discounting 
the opposing communication and, thus ‘inoculated,’ he will tend to retain the 
positive conclusion” (p. 318). Though Lumsdine and Janis were the first to mention 
the inoculation analogy, McGuire (1961a, 1961b) is largely responsible to 
extending the medical analogy into a credible theory.  This section will discuss 
McGuire and colleagues’ original formation of inoculation theory and then explain 
the specific theoretical components and functions of the inoculation process.   
 Just a few years after Lumsdine and Janis coined the inoculation analogy, 
McGuire and colleagues published a flurry of studies transforming a creative 
analogous explanation for the superiority of two-sided messages in stabilizing 
attitudes into a carefully posited theory – inoculation theory (McGuire, 1961a, 
1961b, 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961).  
Recall that Lumsdine and Janis (1953) suggested that two-sided messages served 
the inoculation function because they provided a reason to discount propaganda.  




counterattitudinal messages.  Rather, McGuire built inoculation theory around 
several basic assumptions about an individual’s attitudes.  First, McGuire (1964) 
advanced that people are fundamentally unaware of challenges to their deeply held 
beliefs.  Because they are largely naive to the vulnerability of their attitudes, they 
are “unpracticed” at putting up any legitimate defense of their attitudes in the event 
they are attacked (McGuire, 1964).  Because people are unaware of potential 
challenges to their beliefs; they also have no incentive to protect them (McGuire, 
1964).  Simply put, when people don’t realize their attitudes are vulnerable, they 
have no reason to protect these attitudes, and as a result are unprepared to do so.   
 The assumption about the vulnerability of attitudes to counterattitudinal 
attack is what makes the inoculation analogy so fitting.  In particular, vaccines are 
administered to individuals who have not been infected, but are vulnerable to the 
virus.  McGuire (1964) advanced:  
In the biological situation, the person is typically made resistant to 
some attacking virus by pre-exposure to a weakened dose of the 
virus.  The mild dose stimulates his defenses so that he will be better 
able to overcome any massive viral attack to which he is later 
exposed, but is not so strong that this pre-exposure will itself cause 
the disease. (p. 200). 
 
This analogy underscores two very important components of the inoculation 
process - the inoculation pretreatment and the counterattitudinal attack.  Just like a 
vaccination is administered for the purpose of preventing later viral attacks, in an 
early summary of inoculation research McGuire (1964) explains that the majority 
of the experiments began with the inoculation pretreatment.  In the initial 




small amounts of the counterattitudinal message was all that was necessary to 
generate threat and the subsequent protection of the attitude from later attack but 
later posited that threat was the combination of the realization of the vulnerability 
of a previously unprotected attitude and the exposure to the challenging message 
(Compton & Pfau, 2004).  This analogy underscores two very important 
components of the inoculation process - the inoculation pretreatment and the 
counterattitudinal attack.  Just like a vaccination is administered for the purpose of 
preventing later viral attacks, in an early summary of inoculation research McGuire 
(1964) explains that the majority of the experiments began with the inoculation 
pretreatment.  In the initial inoculation pretreatments, McGuire and colleagues 
believed that the exposure to small amounts of the counterattitudinal message was 
all that was necessary to generate threat and the subsequent protection of the 
attitude from later attack but later posited that threat was the combination of the 
realization of the vulnerability of a previously unprotected attitude and the 
exposure to the challenging message (Compton & Pfau, 2004).   
The integration of a threat into inoculation pretreatment messages was 
believed to address McGuire’s assumption that people are unmotivated to defend 
their ideas, however it did not address the concern that people are vulnerable to 
counterattitudinal attacks because they have very little or no practice defending 
their positions.  As a result, McGuire and colleagues conducted a series of 
experiments to determine what type of content in the inoculation messages and 




participants’ ability to defend their attitudes.  In particular, McGuire (1961a) 
determined that while supportive defense, a strategy designed to bolster the 
strength of the unprotected attitude did effectively strengthen the attitude, when 
that attitude later came under attack, the supportive defense did not provide 
protection for that attitude.  For example, if someone believes that recycling should 
be mandatory around the country, a supportive defense message would essentially 
reinforce their perspective making it stronger.  However, if that same person only 
heard positive things about recycling in a supportive defense message, they would 
not be equipped to defend that view in the face of a strong persuasive message 
apposing mandatory recycling legislation.  McGuire (1961a) concluded that that 
best defense strategy was a combination of both supportive and refutational 
defenses, a strategy designed to highlight the vulnerability of an attitude and 
provide possible arguments in defense of the individual’s position.  This conclusion 
is especially important given that people are generally not motivated to protect 
ideas that they don’t realize are vulnerable and as a result are unequipped to make 
strong arguments to support their positions on the issues.   
McGuire and Papageorgis (1961a) also found that refutational defenses 
were superior to supportive defenses in generating resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion.  These finding provide empirical legitimacy to the theoretical 
application of the inoculation analogy because even a healthy individual is 
vulnerable to a virus, while an individual who has been vaccinated is much more 




In addition to finding the best type of defense strategy for inoculation 
messages, McGuire and colleagues also wanted to address one of the original 
assumptions of inoculation theory.  The original assumption was that because 
people do not realize the vulnerability of their attitudes, they are unprepared to 
defend those attitudes (McGuire, 1964).  McGuire and Papageorgis (1961) posited 
that if the study participants were left alone to form a defense of their attitudes, 
their lack of practice would lead them to produce only a few and likely weak 
arguments in support of their position on the issues.   This strategy was referred to 
as an active defense meaning that the participants must actively generate their own 
arguments to support their position on an issue.   
Conversely, if the participants were given a group of possible defenses to 
attacks on their attitudes, this strategy would facilitate a more effective defense 
upon exposure to later attack.  This strategy was referred to as a passive defense.  
The results of the research provided support for their hypotheses.  McGuire and 
Papageorgis even comment that the participants’ active attempts to generate a 
defense without assistance yielded “meager” essays (p. 334).  They conclude that 
the participants’ inability to generate legitimate defenses to their position may have 
had an even greater weakening effect than expected because the participants might 
have surmised that their original position was uninformed or indefensible (McGuire 
& Papageorgis, 1961).   
As McGuire and Papageorgis (1961) considered the possible limitations of 




they noted that the results of their research revealed a refutational defense 
pretreatment was a better strategy for conferring resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion than a supportive defense strategy.  However, they argued that the 
resistance they observed from the participants in the refutational defense conditions 
might have resulted because they were exposed to a diluted form of the same 
argument they later read in the attack session.  McGuire and Papageorgis suggested 
in their results section that the refutational defense messages designed for the 
inoculation studies may have a “general immunizing effect,” or the ability to 
mitigate the influence of latter exposure to stronger versions of either the same 
attacks they read in the inoculation pretreatment or attacks not presented in the 
inoculation pretreatments (p. 333). They re-referenced the medical inoculation 
analogy advancing “inoculation with a weakened form of one strain of a virus 
produces immunity to other strains as well” (p. 333).   
McGuire and Papgeorgis (1961) suggested that if indeed refutational 
defenses produce a general immunizing effect, it would likely result because the 
participants would realize their attitudes were contestable.  Recognizing the threat 
or the vulnerability of their attitudes should in turn, lead them to consider other 
possible attacks and to develop additional arguments in support of their own 
position.  Furthermore, as the refutational pretreatments expose participants to 
possible attacks on their position, when they later encounter additional other 




laid the foundation for the logic of the general immunizing effect, McGuire (1961a) 
provided evidentiary support for this line of argument.   
McGuire (1961a) advanced that for individuals who received the combined 
strategy of supportive defense and refutational defenses “the conferred resistance is 
almost as great against novel as against the same counterarguments” (p. 194).  
Essentially, participants were resistant to counterattitudinal attacks on an issue even 
when it was not the exact attack they had been warned about in the inoculation 
pretreatment.  This finding was of great importance to the inoculation strategy 
because it is unrealistic for people to think of every conceivable argument against 
their attitude before they are exposed to it.  In fact, Compton and Pfau (2004) 
advanced that the general immunizing effect is a significant finding “because it 
means that inoculation against a limited number of counterarguments affords 
protection against all possible counterarguments” (p. 104-105). The general 
immunizing effect greatly expands the practicality of applications of inoculation 
theory because it would be difficult to foresee all possible counterarguments 
(Compton & Pfau, 2004).   
In summary, inoculation theory has been built and refined using the analogy 
of the medical vaccination (McGuire, 1964).  The research has demonstrated that 
unless people realize the vulnerability of their attitudes, they are likely to be 
unmotivated to protect those attitudes leaving them exposed and susceptible to 
persuasion.  In addition, the research and theorizing demonstrates that it is not 




to be equipped with the seeds of refutational defenses to help them understand and 
prepare for the future counterattitudinal attacks.  It is not enough for individuals to 
realize their attitudes are vulnerable, but rather the research demonstrates that they 
need to be equipped with refutational preemptive arguments because if an 
individual has believed their attitudes to be self-evident, they are unprepared to 
defend them.  Finally, the research demonstrates that inoculation works equally 
well when the attack message is identical to the forewarning contained in the 
pretreatment message as it is when the attack message presents a different or new 
argument.   
The Efficacy of the Inoculation Strategy 
 McGuire and Papageorgis invested a great deal of time carefully applying 
analogous reasoning to build inoculation theory (McGuire, 1961a, 1961b, 1964; 
McGuire, & Papageorgis, 1961; Papageorgis, & McGuire, 1961) and it has become 
one of the leading theoretical frameworks for understanding how individuals 
protect their attitudes and resist counterattitudinal persuasion (Compton & Pfau, 
2004).  In part, the fascination with inoculation theory has been the fitting analogy 
that has driven much of the theorizing and resistance research.  Without question 
the inoculation analogy has captured many researchers’ attention; however what 
has sustained interest for almost a half a century is the consistency of the 
inoculation strategy to confer resistance to persuasion in many contextual domains 




 Together, threat and counterarguing have been credited with the protection 
of a host of attitudes in a variety of contexts in the initial applications of inoculation 
theory and more modern applications as well.  For example, experimental studies 
employing the inoculation strategy have revealed successful applications in the 
context of adolescent health promotion (Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994; Pfau, Van 
Bockern, & Kang, 1992) in which inoculated adolescents with low self-esteem, the 
highest risk group for smoking were significantly more resistant to tobacco 
products and less likely to report smoking (Pfau, et al., 1992).   
 Not only has the inoculation strategy been effective in protecting negative 
attitudes toward tobacco use among at-risk teens, inoculation has been 
demonstrated as an effective strategy to confer resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion in the political communication context.  In particular, inoculation 
effectively conferred resistance to attacks made on an individual’s political 
candidate of choice, especially when the individual strongly identifies with their 
own political party (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988).  Inoculation even works when the 
attacks on their candidate come in the form of direct mail (Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & 
Sorenson, 1990).  Inoculation has also conferred resistance to attacks on an 
individual’s position whether they be for or against such hot-button political issues 
such as a complete ban on the manufacture and sale of handguns, the complete 
legalization of marijuana, the complete legalization of gamboling, and the 




 Inoculation has also been a modestly effective strategy for conferring 
resistance to attacks on commercial products such as pizza, tennis shoes, candy 
bars and writing pens that are delivered through comparative advertising (Pfau, 
1992).  In a further commercial application of inoculation theory, Bechwati and 
Siegal (2005) were interested in what would happen when individuals make a 
purchase decision, but then later are exposed to comparative advertising, which 
undermines the legitimacy of their initial purchasing decision.  They were also 
interested in determining if an inoculation treatment was more effective when it 
showed two portable CD player options on a single screen or if they showed one 
player on one screen and a second player on a later screen.  They found that 
individuals who received the information about both CD players simultaneously 
were more loyal to their first choice when faced with a comparative advertisement 
attack message than those who read information about the players at different time 
sequences.  This research has important implications for not only consumer 
decision-making but also post-consumer decision confidence and loyalty.  
Inoculation also made healthy attitudes about credit and credit cards more resistant 
to the influx of credit advertisements on college campuses (Compton & Pfau, 2004) 
when the inoculation arguments were as strong as the attack messages.   
 Moreover, these applications of inoculation theory in the context of health 
promotion, political advertising, and commercial advertising in addition to many 
more studies provide the evidentiary support for the conclusion that “content is no 




Furthermore, the success of these studies provides empirical support for Szabo and 
Pfau’s (2002) conclusion that “Existing research on inoculation demonstrates 
irrefutably that it is an effective technique in promoting resistance to persuasion” 
(p. 233). Therefore it is predicted:  
H1: Individuals who receive inoculation pretreatments report more threat, 
counterarguing output, and resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion than 
individuals assigned to the control condition.   
Unresolved Issued in Inoculation Theory 
 While the research above has detailed numerous contexts in which 
inoculation has effectively conferred resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion, 
inoculation is not a foolproof strategy.  In fact, further exploration of the 
mechanisms that function to confer resistance is warranted because there are 
notable instances when inoculation has not been an effective strategy for conferring 
resistance to persuasion (Banas & Rains, 2010).  For example, while Compton and 
Pfau (2004) found that inoculation was an effective strategy for promoting 
resistance to credit card advertisements, it was only effective when the quality of 
the inoculation message was the same as the quality of the attack message.   
 When the quality of the messages was mismatched, it seemed that 
inoculation failed to preserve the desired resistance (Compton & Pfau, 2004).  This 
finding raises an important concern about the efficacy of inoculation messages.  
While individual experiments and the meta-analytic review conducted by Banas 




resistance when the issues in the attack messages are identical to those found in the 
inoculation message and when the attack messages are novel to the individual, 
Compton and Pfau’s (2004) findings may provide a boundary condition to the 
general immunizing effect.  In particular, inoculation may be effective for both the 
same arguments and different arguments, but only when the strength of the 
messages is equally matched.   
 Furthermore, in the context of health promotion, Godbold and Pfau (2000) 
investigated the efficacy of inoculation to confer resistance to underage drinking.  
They found that all the participants (both inoculated and non-inoculated) perceived 
there was a real threat that they would be encouraged by their peers to consume 
alcohol.  Furthermore, their results reveal that the pretreatment messages were only 
effective in generating resistance to underage drinking when the inoculation 
messages used a social norming strategy.  In particular, they created one 
inoculation message, which instructed teens that fewer of their peers consumed 
alcohol than they actually thought and explained that when they engage in underage 
drinking, their peers would likely avoid their company.  They found no difference 
in the level of resistance to consume alcohol between the informative inoculation 
condition, in which they reported facts about the physical dangers of underage 
drinking such as injury and death and the control condition.  Perhaps it is not 
surprising that the inoculation manipulation did not hold if the adolescents did not 
believe their friends would avoid them if they consumed alcohol rendering the 




 While the evidence presented to this point make it clear that inoculation is 
generally an effective strategy for conferring resistance to persuasion, further study 
of how to make inoculation more effective is still warranted.  In particular, Banas 
and Rains (2010) suggest that there are still “unsettled issues” (p. 282) that need to 
be explored to maximize the efficacy of inoculation.  The results of the meta-
analytic review conducted by Banas and Rains present several important departure 
points for this investigation.  First, they determine that inoculation is more effective 
for conferring resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion than simply reinforcing 
existing beliefs or receiving a control treatment.  Although the effect size of the 
observed resistance was considered small (Banas & Rains), the efficacy of 
inoculation across different contexts provides an empirical basis on which 
inoculation scholars and practitioners to be reasonably confident that inoculation 
will be an effective strategy for conferring resistance.   
 While Banas and Rain’s (2010) meta-analytic findings provide a measure of 
confidence for the use and application of the inoculation strategy to protect 
attitudes, their findings invite further investigation into the way inoculation 
generates resistance.  In particular, they explored several moderators that would 
affect the extent to which inoculation generates resistance.  Among the moderators 
they tested were threat and issue involvement.   
 Threat is considered foundational to inoculation theory (Compton & Pfau, 
2004; Szabo & Pfau, 2002).  Based on the existing empirical research and narrative 




and Rains surmised that “after receiving the threat component of an inoculation 
treatment, individuals experience heightened motivation to produce attitude-
bolstering materials and engage in counterarguing which enhances resistance” (p. 
286).  They predicted a positive relationship between perceived threat and the level 
of resistance.  While they did find the relationship between threat and resistance to 
be positive, this relationship was not significant.  This finding invites researchers to 
pursue additional tests of the role of threat in inoculation theory.  The kind of threat 
involved is very small as it is only a threat to ideas and not an emotional or physical 
threat, so it should be expected to have a very small effect size. Banas and Rains 
(2010) call attention to this advancing “It is noteworthy, however, that the power 
for this test is quite low. Of course their null finding does not mean threat is not an 
important and key moderator, it is simply a clear invitation for future research to 
explore the role of threat in the inoculation process (Banas & Rains, 2010).   
 In addition to evaluating the role of threat in the inoculation process, Banas 
and Rains (2010) tested the extent to which issue involvement influences the level 
of resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion.  Based on their review of the 
research, they predicted a curvilinear relationship between issue involvement and 
resistance such that individuals with a moderate amount of issue involvement 
would be more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasion than individuals with low 
or high involvement.  Their results revealed no support for a curvilinear 
relationship between issue involvement and resistance.  The results of their 




resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion.  Banas and Rains suggest one possible 
account for the lack of significance for their predictions about the role of threat and 
issue involvement in inoculation was the low amount of power in the tests of these 
relationships.   
 A second possibility for why the results were not significant is that issue 
involvement is generally confined to the issues selected for the inoculation 
experiments rather than a variable that is directly manipulated by the researchers 
(Banas & Rains, 2010).  They suggest that researchers select topics in which 
participants have varying levels of involvement so as to demonstrate the differential 
influence of issue involvement on resistance.  Moreover, to better understand the 
role of involvement, Banas and Rains suggest that future researchers should 
actively manipulate the level of the participants’ involvement in order to better 
understand the role of this moderator in the process of resistance.   
 This investigation recognizes the importance of receiver motivation at all 
stages of inoculation starting with the topic selection, moving to the inoculation 
treatment and ending with the attack messages.  A concept central to the 
inoculation process is motivation and receiver involvement is just one 
manifestation of motivation.  Threat too, is considered to be the motivational force 
that leads individuals to engage in counterarguing and later resist counterattitudinal 
persuasion.  Because Banas and Rains did not provide direct answers to the issues 
of threat and involvement, it is reasonable to assume that understanding the role of 




Inoculation and Stealth Campaigns 
 The context of front group stealth messages is a fitting venue for improving 
what is currently known about motivation in inoculation research.  Many of the 
issues that front group stealth campaigns focus their efforts around are relatively 
uninvolving to the general public and as a likely result, their messages are given 
little careful consideration (Pfau et al., 2007).  Ultimately stealth messages can be 
very compelling not because of the merits of their arguments but because the names 
of the groups sound positive and the projects they undertake also sound vaguely 
positive (Pfau et al., 2007).  This context would also be a fruitful area to explore in 
order to bring further clarity to the conflicting findings between two recent 
experiments that were conducted to determine the efficacy of inoculation to confer 
resistance to front group stealth messages.   
While Pfau et al. (2007) found that inoculation was an effective strategy to 
promote resistance to front groups’ stealth messages, the results of the Robertson et 
al. (2010) experiment failed to reproduce these results.  Finally, the context of front 
groups is an excellent opportunity to present a theoretical merger between 
inoculation theory and a leading model in persuasion theory, the HSM.  This 
theoretical merger was first suggested by Pfau and colleagues (2007) and later was 
nominally adopted by Robertson and colleagues (2010), but neither study has 
tapped into the full range of the possible conceptual mergers or experimental 
procedures offered by the body of experimental research provided by the HSM that 




stealth messages and generating the desired resistance to the deceptive front group 
messages. This section will introduce these studies and discuss their relevant 
findings.   
 Pfau and colleagues (2007) conducted an experiment to test the influence of 
front group stealth messages.  They advanced while front group stealth messages 
were likely to be misleading and persuasive, front groups’ effectiveness had never 
been tested empirically.  They contended there are two possible accounts for why 
front groups would be effective.  First, they advanced individuals are likely to give 
front groups a great deal of leeway or grace in how they present their messages 
because they themselves regularly present themselves in the most favorable light.  
Second, they are simply unmotivated to process front group messages (Pfau et al., 
2007).  A possible third argument is even if they are ethically suspect, front-groups 
may often—half the time, at least—offer pro-attitudinal arguments.  Taken 
together, the lack of processing motivation coupled with the expectation the front 
group stands for something good, mixed with some potentially pro-attitudinal 
arguments should contribute to the greater persuasive impact of the front group 
message.  The theory and research behind these two arguments is important to 
understand because both the Pfau et al. (2007) front group research and the 
Robertson et al. (2010) research were built around these two explanations. 
 To better understand this research, it is important to explore Pfau et al.’s 
(2007) account for front group effectiveness.  Again, they argued that because 




same opportunity to front groups (Pfau et al., 2007).  They based their argument on 
deception research from Schlenker (2003), advancing that most people realize that 
people want to present their very best image and as a result provide that same 
courtesy to other individuals as well.  While it is reasonable to assume individuals 
are given a great deal of grace in matters of self-presentation, it is likely to be an 
altogether different story if a front group misleads another person in a potentially 
dangerous way.  For example, if their tactics were discovered, the measure of grace 
Pfau and colleagues suggested as a potential explanation for the persuasiveness of 
front groups would vanish and the evaluation of that front group would suffer.  It is 
important to keep in mind that the inoculation strategy is designed to strengthen an 
individual’s current attitude toward an issue.  Thus, Pfau and colleagues findings 
likely apply more readily to an audience who holds the opposite opinion as that 
expressed by the front group. A partisan audience might excuse a front group’s 
deceptive tactics as a means to an end.   
 This negative evaluation of front group credibility is exactly what Pfau and 
colleagues’ (2007) found.  When some of the participants were made aware of the 
fact that they had been persuaded by front group stealth messages, the participants’ 
ratings of the front groups’ organizational credibility, citizenship, and reputation 
dropped significantly.  Pfau and colleagues conceptualized the organizational 
credibility as the participants’ assessment of the organization’s reputation.  They 
measured organizational credibility drawing on Dowling’s (2001) 




perceived trustworthiness, confidence, and positive word of mouth (Pfau et al., 
2006).  The drop in perceived trustworthiness of these organizations does not 
provide the support for Pfau and colleagues’ initial argument that front groups 
would be persuasive and because individuals would give them a measure of 
freedom to present themselves in the most favorable light.  However, the 
deceptiveness of front group stealth campaigns is likely to have a role in their 
effectiveness, just not in the same way proposed by Pfau et al.  In particular, people 
are often influenced by deceptive messages because they are not good at detecting 
deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 2008), because people have a truth-bias or “the 
tendency to overestimate others ‘truthfulness” (Burgoon, Blair, & Strom, 2008, p. 
573), and because deceptive messages are subtlety and skillfully constructed to 
make them appear to reflect the truth.   
 The second reason Pfau et al. (2007) proposed that front group stealth 
messages are likely to be effective because individuals are so preoccupied with 
their own lives they have little time or too little interest to consider public policy 
issues (Pfau et al., 2007).  Essentially, they are not motivated to carefully consider 
many of the messages they encounter unless they understand how they are directly 
related to their day-to-day experiences.  Building their arguments on the research 
and theorizing produced by Chaiken and colleagues’ HSM (1980), Pfau and 
colleagues advanced because individuals are so unmotivated to carefully consider 
messages about public policy, they would likely employ heuristic processing.  The 




1980).  The first approach, systematic processing, is marked by careful scrutiny of 
the message and the second approach, the heuristic approach, is characterized by 
invoking simple decision rules that facilitate relatively easy assessments about the 
persuasive message (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002).  This research will be 
reviewed in more detail in the next section.   
 Again, Pfau and colleagues did not test their message processing argument 
empirically.  As a result, it is unclear what the role of motivation to process the 
messages had in both the effectiveness of the front group stealth messages and the 
efficacy of the inoculation treatments that were employed.  Even without the direct 
empirical evidence of the role of motivation, it is very likely that front groups are 
effective because people were unmotivated to process the messages carefully or to 
seek additional information about front groups even when the inoculation 
pretreatment messages encouraged them to do so.  It is likely that the participants 
drew on heuristic cues such as “experts can be trusted” or “the more consumer 
choices the better,” or perhaps the pro-social sounding names like Keep America 
Beautiful and Center for Consumer Freedom lead to their conclusion that “the 
group stands for things I believe in.”  
 Pfau and colleagues’ research is important because it did provide the first 
known empirical support for the fact that front group stealth messages are effective 
(Pfau et al., 2007).  In addition, they discovered that inoculation was an effective 




an important step in understanding the influence of front groups, and given the fact 
these groups are likely to be well funded (Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; Sullivan, 
2011) and are bent on using deceptive tactics to accomplish their political or 
financial goals, it is very fruitful to identify strategies to reduce their influence.  
Furthermore, this research provided a great argumentative and empirical foundation 
on which Robertson et al. (2010) built their research.   
 To further understand why front group stealth messages are effective and 
how inoculation could be used to reveal their deceptive techniques to consumers, 
Robertson et al. (2010) conducted a follow up study.  They noted that while Pfau et 
al. (2007) had presented a strong argument that individuals were likely to be 
persuaded by stealth messages because they were unmotivated to systematically 
process the messages, they did not test this explanation empirically.  To fill this gap 
Robertson et al. proposed that an individual’s level of cognitive effort or the extent 
to which they systematically or heuristically processed the front group stealth 
messages would influence their assessments of a front group’s authority or 
expertise and character, two of the dimensions that make up source credibility 
(McCroskey, 1966).  In particular, they predicted that the more a person relied on 
heuristic processing, the more likely they were to evaluate the front group as 
credible (having strong expertise and good character) despite the low quality of 
their message.  Conversely, they predicted that the more a person relied on 





 In addition, based on the existing research that had demonstrated the 
efficacy of inoculation to confer resistance to counterattitudinal messages (Szabo & 
Pfau, 2002) and the recent empirical support for the inoculation strategy presented 
by Pfau and colleagues (2007), Robertson et al. (2010) predicted that individuals 
who received an inoculation treatment would be more resistant to front group 
stealth messages than those in the control group. Furthermore, they predicted that 
the inoculation treatments would generate more anger than the control message and 
as a result would promote greater systematic processing and counterarguing output.  
Finally, Robertson and colleagues posed a research question to determine whether 
an inoculation treatment that focused on the tactics of one front group would confer 
resistance to the same front group featured in the inoculation message and to 
different front groups not mentioned in the inoculation treatment.   
 The results of their investigation revealed that as the participant’s heuristic 
processing increases, their assessment of the front group’s credibility also 
increased.  However, contrary to their prediction, the relationship between 
systematic message processing and their assessments of front group credibility was 
negative although not significant.  These findings may be a result of the 
unconventional employment of Novak and Hoffman’s (2009) measure of message 
processing rather than the traditional thought listing techniques employed in 
message processing research.  The Novak and Hoffman scale was a self-report of 
processing, and it may very well be inferior in terms of accuracy and reliability to 




this unexpected finding was that front groups are so skilled at the way they present 
themselves and their messages, that even if a person is carefully considering the 
quality and validity of stealth messages, they may not be adequately equipped to 
identify the misleading or deceptive nature of the messages. An additional 
possibility is that front group messages are very compelling and even factually 
correct in spite of the fact that their supporters have gone to great lengths to conceal 
their identity and their interests in the issues.   
 Unfortunately, while Robertson and colleagues came closer to actually 
looking at the extent to which the participants processed the messages, they failed 
to assess the different types of motivations people have for processing persuasive 
messages.  Furthermore, rather than using the thought-listing procedure used in 
previous HSM experiments (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; 
Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Darke, Chaiken, Bohner, Einwiler, Erb & 
Hazlewood, 1998); they used the Task Specific Thinking Style (TSTS) (Novak & 
Hoffman, 2005) to evaluate the participants’ level of message processing.  The 
TSTS scale may have been a poor choice for measuring message processing 
because it is essentially a self-report of the extent to which the participants believed 
they carefully processed the message (Novak & Hoffman, 2009).  Taken together, 
these two weaknesses of the previous study also made it very difficult for 
Robertson and colleagues to draw conclusions about the role of motivation and 




 In addition, Robertson and colleagues predicted that inoculation would be 
an effective strategy for conferring resistance to front group stealth messages.  
While their results revealed that compared to controls, inoculated participants 
reported more threat, systematic processing, anger directed toward the front-group 
stealth messages, and lower evaluations of front-group credibility, they found no 
difference between the groups on the number of counterarguments they produced 
nor the level of resistance to front group stealth messages.  It may be that this result 
simply highlights a lack of efficacy to counter-argue rather than a lack of 
motivation to do so.  Again, Robertson and colleagues suggest that a person may be 
adequately warned that the front groups are persuasive and deceptive, but they may 
not be equipped with a way to identify false or misleading statements made by 
these groups.   
 As there seems to be a general consensus that more research is needed to 
better understand how inoculation works and how to improve its use (Compton & 
Pfau, 2004; Szabo & Pfau, 2002), and Banas and Rains (2010) gave a specific call 
to better understand the role of motivation in the inoculation process, this 
investigation attempts to improve inoculation theory by fully drawing on the HSM 
both conceptually and procedurally.  This will improve on the two studies just 
detailed and it will also open future directions to manipulate the participant’s level 




Heuristic Systematic Model of Persuasive Message Processing  
 The HSM was posited by Chaiken (1980) to describe the two routes of 
cognitive message processing, to explain how individuals cognitively process 
persuasive messages, and to predict the conditions in which individuals will 
process a message systematically, heuristically, or when both the systematic routes 
will be employed in the decision-making process.  The HSM has inspired 
communication and social psychological researchers to push toward a better 
understanding of how the human mind sifts through myriad persuasive attempts.  
Moreover, because this research is designed to understand how individuals might 
process and respond to front groups’ stealth messages, it is important to review the 
HSM.  The HSM has been applied to inform research in marketing and consumer 
behavior (Darke, Freedman, & Chaiken, 1995), and political initiative 
endorsements (Forehand, Gastil, & Smith, 2002).  Given that front groups are 
designed to weigh in on both consumer and political decision making, the model is 
well equipped to address the type of processing that likely takes place as 
individuals are exposed to stealth messages.   
The Theoretical Postulates of the HSM 
The HSM postulates two distinct routes to cognitive message processing 
(Chaiken, 1980).  The first approach, systematic processing is marked by careful 
scrutiny of the message and the second approach, the heuristic approach, is 
characterized by invoking simple decision rules that facilitate relatively easy 




Eagly, 1989).  Chaiken and her colleagues have committed considerable time and 
attention to quantifying the presence of two distinct routes of cognitive processing 
(Axsom, Chaiken, & Yates, 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Duckworth, & Darke, 
1999; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994).  This section will discuss the systematic, 
heuristic, and simultaneous routes in more detail, the underlying motivational 
antecedents of each type of processing, and finally discuss the nature of decisions 
made under each type of processing.   
Systematic Processing 
According to Chaiken (1980), systematic processing requires a message 
receiver to fully examine a message in order to understand it and to determine the 
quality of the arguments and whether the evidence presented supports the claim of 
the message.  The original definition was later bolstered by Eagly and Chaiken 
(1993) to include more detail to the extent and intensity characterized by systematic 
processing.  Specifically, they advanced that when a person is engaged in 
systematic processing they actively integrate all the relevant information available 
in order to make the decision at hand.  This definition offers a more complete 
explanation of the systematic processing than the original definition, which only 
predicted that people engage in systematic processing when they were sufficiently 
motivated to determine the accuracy or validity of an argument (Chaiken, 1980).  
Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen (1996) later acknowledged that individuals have 




 Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen (1996) argue that beyond the motivation to 
be accurate in decision-making, individuals have a defense motivation and an 
impression motivation.  In particular the “defense motivation is an orientation 
toward reinforcing important self-related beliefs, and impression motivation is an 
orientation toward holding and expressing beliefs dictated by the current 
interpersonal situation” (Chaiken et al., 1996, p. 554).  It would seem that the threat 
function in inoculation treatments maps on very closely with the defense 
motivation because the threat makes salient the importance of maintaining an 
individual’s existing beliefs on a particular issue.   
 While Chaiken (1980) primarily focused her original conceptualization of 
systematic processing on the careful evaluation of the quality or validity of the 
arguments, she and her colleagues continued to improve this focus in later research.  
A further nuance of the later definition of systematic processing is the reference to 
all relevant information (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagley, 1998).  Specifically, they 
defined systematic processing as “a comprehensive, analytic orientation in which 
perceivers access and scrutinize all informational input for its relevance and 
importance to their judgment task, and integrate all useful information in forming 
their judgments” (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagley, 1989, p. 212).  Systematic 
processing means that the message receiver is fully engaged not only in what the 
current message says, but also with integrating what they already know, think, and 
feel about the topic in order to draw their final decision about the message 




 It is important to note that systematic processing does not directly account 
for persuasion; rather attitude and behavioral change are contingent on how well a 
receiver comprehends and how thoroughly the relative merits of the persuasive 
message are considered (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagley, 1989).  Because message 
understanding and elaboration mediate persuasion when an individual is 
systematically processing, it follows that an individual would be more focused on 
the arguments themselves rather than on who is presenting the arguments.  Chaiken 
and colleagues have repeatedly found that when an individual is engaged in 
systematic processing they will indeed place a greater premium on what is said than 
who says it (Axsom, et al., 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; 
Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).   
 For example, Axsom et al., (1987) asked participants engaged in systematic 
processing about an appeal to save money by moving prisoners from jail to 
probation.  The participants could consider the strength of the evidence presented in 
the message that connected the proposed change to the probable savings rather than 
the source, or other external cues such as an audience’s favorable responses or the 
consensus of the audience members.  By carefully attending to the message rather 
than source characteristics, individuals who engaged in systematic processing 
considered the logic of the arguments and the likelihood that the proposed change 
in the probation policy could help the state save money.   
 In a related investigation, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) asked 




of the participants read the information from a high credibility source (Consumer 
Reports) and the other half read the information about the product from a low 
credibility source (a promotional pamphlet).  In addition, half of the participants 
were motivated to systematically process the messages by explaining to them that 
the phone companies were considering their opinion very carefully in order to 
determine if they should attempt to sell the product in the local area.  The other half 
of the participants were told that their individual evaluation of the products were 
unimportant because they would be combined with a large amount of other 
responses.  These participants were also told that the telephone company was using 
these opinions to determine if they should sell the answering machine in a different 
region.  Upon analyzing the participants’ responses to the thought-listing prompt, 
the researchers concluded that highly motivated participants’ attitudes about the 
answering machines were based on the quality of the supporting material and 
product information while the participants who had little motivation based their 
opinion about the product on the credibility of the source presenting the 
information.   
 Systematic processing is characterized by the careful consideration of all 
information available including message characteristics, source characteristics, and 
even the information an individual has about a particular topic.  Moreover it is 
likely that systematic processing can provide the best opportunity for individuals to 
distinguish a front group from a legitimate grassroots organization, to identify 




consider that there may be some important information the front group is not 
including in their messages.  Individuals who are highly motivated by accuracy in 
their decision- making and are exposed to inoculation pretreatments emphasizing 
careful consideration of front group strategies are likely to engage in more 
systematic processing when they encounter a stealth message than individuals who 
are less motivated and are not exposed to the inoculation messages.   
Heuristic Processing 
According to Chaiken et al. (1989) “The cornerstone of heuristic processing 
is the idea that specific rules, schemata, or heuristics can mediate people’s attitude 
(or other social) judgments” (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 216).  When a message 
receiver uses heuristic processing he or she is less likely to consider the merits of 
the arguments presented and more likely to draw on easy cues or decision rules like 
the credibility of the source or the number of arguments presented (Chaiken, 1980).  
Within the HSM, the term heuristic cue is used to denote any decision-rule that is 
called upon to facilitate quick evaluations of a message or decision-making in a 
relatively simple conclusion about a persuasive message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
Chaiken et al., 1989).  Heuristic cues are formed from an individual’s previous 
experiences and through the process of socialization (Chaiken et al., 1989).   
 Findings from HSM investigations document numerous heuristic cues that 
are applied during passive processing sessions that characterize heuristic 
processing.  For example, Chaiken and colleagues (1989) contend that the heuristic 




generally agree with people they like,” can be called upon to evaluate the likeability 
of a source, “length implies strength” can be used to evaluate a long or short 
message (p. 216). Additional possible heuristics could be “I agree with groups that 
stand for my values,” or “groups that have positive sounding names, stand for 
something positive.” These and other heuristic cues can be used to facilitate rapid 
decision-making about the persuasive message without the need to consider all of 
the message-related details.   
 In the context of front group stealth messages, Pfau and colleagues (2007) 
suggest that one of the reasons why front groups are likely to be so successful is 
that many people are not very knowledgeable or interested in the issues that front 
groups are often involved in.  As a result, it is likely that individuals would engage 
in the surface level consideration of stealth messages, or even more simply, 
thinking “with a name like ‘Keep America Beautiful’, it has to be good.”  These 
stealth messages are designed to be misleading and persuasive, and heuristic 
processing may not contribute to accurate decision making about their messages.  It 
is also likely that messages that are presented in the form of an advertisement lack 
the depth of information that a person would need to engage in systematic 
processing.  As a result, individuals would need to do their own research.  In most 
cases, a person who would take the time to do this research would be very highly 
motivated.   
 The result of heuristic processing has been documented in the Chaiken 




influenced the unmotivated participants’ decisions about sleep habits and whether 
or not the school should move to a trimester system.  In addition, as previously 
mentioned, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) discovered that unmotivated 
participants formed their attitudes about a new answering machine on the basis of 
the credibility of the message source.  Heuristic processing was also detailed in the 
Axom et al., (1987) research which examined the extent to which people engaged 
in systematic or heuristic processing about the merits of moving prisoners to 
probation to save the state money.  Some subjects were assigned to a condition 
where audience members cheered and clapped as the source presented the 
arguments in favor of moving prisoners from behind bars to probation, whereas 
others were randomly assigned to a condition were the audience members booed 
and showed signs of disapproval.   
 In these cases, the subjects who were engaged in heuristic processing likely 
invoked a heuristic cue such as “If other people think the message is correct, then it 
is probably valid” (Axom et al., 1987, p.39). Participants who were less motivated 
to process the message than those who were highly motivated were more likely to 
provide a favorable evaluation of the message when they were encountered the 
clapping and cheering messages (Axom et al., 1987).  Furthermore, compared to 
highly motivated participants, less motivated participants who were exposed to 
negative audience feedback evaluated the message unfavorably (Axom et al., 




the decision making task, they can be more influenced by cues external to the 
message like group consensus than by the quality of the arguments in the messages.   
 Not only does the HSM describe the nature of heuristic processing, it also 
predicts when different heuristic cues will be employed to make quick assessments 
about persuasive messages.  Three principles predict the likelihood that a person 
might draw on a heuristic cue when engaged in heuristic processing.  These 
predictors include: availability, accessibility, and applicability (Chaiken et al., 
1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  First, a decision rule can be employed only if the 
individual engaged in message assessment has it stored in their memory (Chaiken 
et al., 1989).  Specifically, this prediction is based on the work of Higgins (1989), 
who argues that knowledge and attitude structures are formed as a result of a 
person’s experiences or through the process of socialization and practical 
knowledge.  If a person does not have some type of cognitive entry or account for a 
decision rule, it cannot be called upon to guide passive decision-making during the 
heuristic processing of a message.  Second, a heuristic cue must also be readily 
accessible for an individual to recall and use while heuristically processing a 
message (Chaiken et al., 1989).   
 For example, if a heuristic cue like “experts can be trusted” is drawn on 
regularly to make decisions about persuasive messages, this heuristic may be used 
with greater ease than a decision rule that is only called upon in extremely rare 
conditions.  Finally, the heuristic must be applicable to the decision at hand 




heuristic cue is not relevant, then it would likely not be used as a guide in the 
decision making process because it will be identified as inapplicable.  For example, 
the heuristic, “What is beautiful is good” may be both available and accessible to a 
person who is making a decision about supporting the front group Keep America 
Beautiful, however they would find this decision rule to be less useful when 
considering a donation to the Center for Consumer Freedom.   
Simultaneous Processing  
One of the central strengths of the HSM is that it extends beyond a simple 
bifurcation of heuristic and systematic processing to predict the conditions when 
both modes of processing will be engaged simultaneously.  Chaiken and colleagues 
posit three conditions in which an individual will engage in systematic and 
heuristic processing simultaneously (Todorov et al., 2002).  The first hypothesis, 
the additivity hypothesis predicts that when a person considers the relative merits 
of the arguments and draws upon heuristic cues and determines that they are 
complementary, then each type of processing can account both independently and 
in aggregate for the persuasive outcome (Todorov et al., 2002).  An experiment 
conducted by Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) found support for the additivity 
hypothesis.  Participants were asked to evaluate a new answering machine much 
like the Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) investigation.  The participants were 
assigned to a condition in which they read favorable evaluations of what they 
believed to be consumer survey of the product or negative evaluations of the 




answering machine compared to two other answering machines or a negative 
evaluation reported by an independent product assessment facility (Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991).   
 The results of their investigation reveal that when the participants were 
highly motivated to process the messages, and when both the independent product 
assessment and the consumer survey results matched, the participants attitudes 
about the answering machine were formed on the basis of both types of 
information.  The consensus information therefore acted as a heuristic cue and the 
independent evaluation of the product compared to two others provided the 
argumentative foundation for their assessment.  In this case both heuristic and 
systematic processing guided their evaluation of the product (Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991).   
 The second hypothesis, the attenuation hypothesis, was posited to explain 
and predict the outcome of the likely event that an individual is motivated to 
systematically and heuristically process a message, but finds the hard arguments 
and the heuristic cues to be in conflict.  In these instances, Chaiken and colleagues 
predict the conclusions derived from systematic processing will exert a stronger 
influence on the final decision about the answering machine than would heuristic 
cues.  Thus the systematic processing will attenuate the heuristic cues (Todorov et 
al., 2002).  For example, if a person who was made aware of front group tactics and 




message even if a heuristic cue such as the pro-social sounding name of the group 
is also considered.   
 Chaiken and colleagues have also found empirical support for the 
attenuation hypothesis.  In particular, Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) found that 
when participants were unmotivated to carefully process the message, but presented 
with conflicting information from the consumer survey (consensus cue) and the 
independent product assessment company (comparative evidence about the product 
quality), the presence of the conflicting information lead the individuals to form 
their attitude about the product on the basis of the evidence presented comparing 
the answering machine to two other products rather than the consensus information.   
 The final scenario in which both heuristic and systematic processing can be 
seen to function simultaneously is called the bias hypothesis.  The bias hypothesis 
predicts that when an individual encounters an event in which they cannot 
differentiate the meaning of the arguments provided, then they will draw more 
heavily on the heuristic cue to make their final decision (Todorov et al., 2002).  For 
example, if a person is presented by a set of arguments by a highly credible or 
attractive source, a strategy often used by front groups, but finds the information 
within the arguments to be confusing or perhaps even in conflict, than they are 
more likely to resort to the use of a heuristic cue such as “experts can be trusted,” 
or “what is beautiful is good” to help them sift through the confusing information.  




so even someone who is motivated to be correct, may ultimately resort to heuristic 
cues.   
Motivations for Message Processing 
 Because individuals are inundated with persuasive stimuli from all 
directions, a model that attempts to describe and explain how persuasive messages 
are processed should account for the numerous motivations an individual might 
have to pay close attention to a message.  More specifically, one of the strengths of 
the HSM is its isolation of three types of motivation as key predictors of when an 
individual is likely to systematically process a message and when they will likely 
heuristically processes the message (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996).  As 
previously stated the HSM assumes that individuals are motivated by the desire to 
hold accurate attitudes or to be accurate in their decision making, they are 
motivated by the desire to preserve attitudes that are important to them, and they 
are motivated to hold attitudes that are acceptable to their peers (Chaiken et al., 
1996).  Chaiken et al. (1989) advance that because people are economically 
minded; they must be sufficiently motivated to engage in systematic processing.   
 Not only do Chaiken and colleagues posit three types of motivations to 
engage in message processing, they also specify a threshold at which point a person 
is no longer willing to use simple heuristic cues and instead opt for systematic 
processing.  If there was no prediction about when a person would be more likely 
to process a message systematically and when they would process a message 




Chaiken and colleagues recognized this need and to address this concern, they 
proposed the sufficiency principle of motivation.   
 According to Chaiken and colleagues (1996), the HSM grounds predictions 
about motivation on the basis of the sufficiency principle.  They advance that the 
sufficiency principle represents the “tradeoff” between engaging in as little effort 
possible and feeling confident that the judgment was satisfactory (p. 554). 
Furthermore, they specify that the sufficiency principle is comprised of a scale of 
confidence in decision-making.  In particular, they advance that the relevant points 
on this scale are “the level of actual confidence in one’s judgments, and the level of 
desired confidence, or sufficiency threshold” (p. 554). Chaiken and colleagues 
argue that if an individual is capable of careful consideration of the messages, they 
will do so only “until the level of actual confidence is raised to the level of desired 
confidence, thereby closing the gap between the two” (p. 554).   
 Put simply, the sufficiency principle of the HSM predicts that an individual 
will engage in systematic processing only when they are confident that the use of 
heuristic cues are insufficient to draw the optimal conclusion.  Not only do they 
have to be confident that drawing on heuristic cues will be insufficient to arrive at 
the optimal conclusion, they have to be personally motivated enough to desire 
accuracy, social acceptability, or attitude preservation.  Under the tenants of the 
HSM, this means that a person must be sufficiently motivated to make a correct 
decision, to make a socially acceptable decision, or to protect a valued attitude, 




 Each type of motivation can contribute in a unique way to message 
processing in both the systematic and heuristic route.  As a case in point, the 
accuracy motivation, which is the desire to make valid decisions or the “right” 
decision based on the information that is available, functions differently depending 
on which route of message processing is being engaged.  For example, when a 
person is systematically processing a message, the accuracy motivation will propel 
them to sift through the message looking for the quality of the arguments, the 
relevance of the arguments, and the clarity of the arguments presented while a 
person engaging in heuristic processing may draw on a simple decision rule such as 
“experts can be trusted” (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989).  However, if the 
message is very short, they may be left to draw conclusions solely on the basis of 
what is presented.  In both cases the receivers are motivated to reach the accurate 
conclusion, and indeed they may arrive at the same decision, yet the paths they take 
to make their decision about the message at hand are altogether different.  
HSM Account for Stealth Message Effectiveness  
 This section will draw on the research and theorizing of the HSM to present 
possible improvements to both previous front group studies in order to present both 
an empirical explanation for the success of front groups based on the level of 
message processing and the differential levels of message processing will have in 
the resistance process, which were the original goals of both Pfau and colleagues 
(2007) and Robertson and colleagues (2010).  A special feature of Chaiken’s HSM 




processing to engage in simultaneous processing.  In particular, Chaiken and 
colleagues advance that when an individual is motivated to systematically process 
the messages, but finds the message to be confusing, ambiguous or to be 
contradictory, they revert to heuristic cues to process a message (Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994).  They refer to this scenario as the bias hypothesis.  For 
example, if a person is presented by a set of arguments by a front group that seems 
very credible (heuristic cue) or seems to be highly committed to pro-social 
concerns, but finds the information within the arguments to be vague, confusing or 
perhaps misleading (argument quality), then they are more likely to resort to the 
use of a heuristic cue such as “experts can be trusted,” or “I like people or groups 
who like what I like,” to help them sift through the confusing information.   
 The HSM’s bias hypothesis (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) seems to be 
consistent with the pattern that has emerged over the years of deception research – 
that humans are poor lie detectors (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008).  In fact, the 
research demonstrates that individuals are so poor at detecting deception that their 
chances of accurately detecting deception in an interaction is not much greater than 
flipping a coin (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008).  In the cases when deception is 
present, it is likely that individuals are motivated to find the truth, but that when 
they are presented with deceptive or misleading information, they may have to rely 





 Front group stealth messages are designed to mislead individuals to believe 
that there is grassroots support for a position or idea that may be quite legitimate, 
but would not be politically or socially expedient for a politician or corporation to 
hold (Beder, 1998; Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2002; Pfau et al., 2007; Sullivan, 
2011).  Stealth messages are so skillfully designed that even a person motivated by 
accuracy might scratch their heads and be unable to point to a passage in a front 
group stealth message that was patently false.  This may leave some to legitimately 
pose the question, are front groups really deceptive if it is difficult to point out 
specific examples of blatant deception? To respond to this challenge, a brief 
discussion of the definitions of deception is in order.   
Vrij (2000) advances that deception is “a successful or unsuccessful 
deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief, which the 
communicator considers to be untrue” (p. 6).  While Vrij’s definition is not 
uniformly employed in all current deception research, it does address the important 
elements of deception including: the intention to mislead as well as a sender and 
receiver role in an interaction.  In fact, it is quite similar to Buller and Burgoon’s 
(1996) conceptualization of deception as “a message knowingly transmitted by a 
sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver” (p. 205). Buller and 
Burgoon’s definition conforms nicely to Vrij’s definition because it stresses the 
deception is deliberate or “knowingly transmitted” and that the message is designed 
to mislead a recipient.  The entire design of a front group, whether corporate or 




definition of deception.  Front groups are given positive names to foster a false 
belief or to lead people to believe they represent a pro-social grassroots movement 
of concerned citizens.  Furthermore, corporations and individuals knowingly create 
or fund these front groups in order to achieve their corporate or political goals.  At 
the time, both George W. Bush and American war hero and veteran Senator John 
McCain both of whom are Republicans, condemned the Swift Boat Veterans for 
Truth message as deceptive and disgraceful (Factcheck.org, 2004).  While front 
groups like Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and others are designed for the purpose 
of misleading others, and have the characteristic of “objective falsity” (Masip, 
Garrido, & Herrero, 2004, p. 147) deciphering the deceptive messages is still 
difficult. It may be that the content of the messages are not deceptive even though 
the front groups was designed to mislead the public about the source of those 
messages. Elliot and Culver (1992) provide an additional definition of deception 
that can account for this detection difficulty.  Specifically, they advance that  
Person A acts deceptively by withholding information only if (a) 
Person A intentionally withholds a proposition that he or she 
believes to be true and belies that withholding will lead Person B to 
form or maintain a false belief; and (b) Person A breaks a law, 
breaks a promise, cheats, or neglects a duty by withholding the 
information (Elliot & Culver, 1992, p. 73).   
 
In fact, Schweitzer and Croson (1999) advance that people would prefer to use 
omission or withholding information as a strategy to deceive others than to use lies 
of commission or the generation of untruthful information.  Keeping this definition 
of deception in mind, a review of the  “Guiding Principles” published on the Keep 




around the United States reveals that the group emphasizes education, individual 
responsibility, and community networks, and volunteerism as the key factors to 
promoting environmental responsibility (kab.org, 2006).  These positions have 
merit and are not on face false. The real deception is the concealment of the 
message source and the special interest that is protected by the creation of these 
groups. In this case, Elliot and Culver’s (1992) definition that addresses the 
deceptive nature of omitted information may be an important nuance that Masip, 
Garrido, and Herrero (2004) requirement for “objective falsity” (p. 147) of 
information overlooks.   
 These legitimate recommendations can be misleading to the extent that they 
are designed to make people focus on individual and community groups rather than 
the responsibility of corporations to make products and packaging that are more 
environmentally sustainable.  The organization has made a “Guide to Litter 
Prevention” packet available on their website “preventcigarettelitter.org.” While 
they do report that Phillip Morris funded the research behind the prevention plan, 
what is missing from the report is any action the cigarette companies can take to 
lessen the environmental impact of cigarette litter.   
 To most readers, these goals would seem laudable and well warranted given 
the considerable amount of trash and litter produced in the United States.  
However, what is missing from these guiding principles is the clear attempt to 
guide the discussion about litter away from corporations who produce packaging, 




littered.  It is not that there is anything factually incorrect about many of their 
messages; it is about what their message skillfully circumvents.  Again, Elliot and 
Culver (1992) suggest that it is deceptive to withhold information from another 
people in order to avoid their responsibility.  In this case, it is deceptive for 
industry-funded groups to create an image of care and responsibility for the 
environment when they leave out any responsibility that their own organization has 
to environmental preservation.  If this mismatch of motives were made salient to 
readers, they would likely question the sincerity of the organization to make 
environmentally responsible decisions.   
 Returning to the bias hypothesis (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), it is likely 
that even an individual who is motivated to hold accurate attitudes about the 
environment and clean-up efforts might be very influenced by Keep America 
Beautiful because both the name of the group and its guiding principles seem to 
represent positive values.  They would have no choice but to draw on heuristic cues 
such as the positive name of the group. Even when individuals are made to be 
suspicious of a source, they cannot readily distinguish between truthful and 
deceptive messages and in fact, suspicion may make it even harder to accurately 
detect deception (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994).   
 While the majority of deception research has been conducted in the context 
of interpersonal communication, several factors make deception research relevant 
to the present investigation.  First, front-group stealth messages are designed to 




2011).  The names of front groups are strategically selected to mislead individuals 
about the purpose of the front group and the sponsors of the front groups (Beder, 
1998, Fitzpatrick & Palenchar, 2006; Pfau et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2011).  Second, 
even when inoculation messages make individuals question the front groups’ 
credibility, suspicion alone does not equip individuals to separate the fact from 
fiction in front group stealth message just as it does not in interpersonal contexts.  
Third, inoculation messages encouraged readers to “Find out about the sponsor and 
their true values by going on-line,” yet participants were not given an opportunity 
to go on-line to track down the truth about the front-groups.  Ultimately, while their 
suspicion was peaked they were still no better prepared to identify false and 
misleading statements than before.  However, inoculation messages can be 
designed differently.   
 This research intends to redesign the previous inoculation pretreatment 
messages used in both previous front group inoculation studies to more clearly 
highlight front group strategies (Pfau et al., 2007; Robertson et al., 2010).  The 
highlighted strategies will focus on responsibility, argument quality, and group 
names.  Because the new inoculation message will focus on responsibility, 
arguments, and names, these inoculation messages will be called RAN messages.  
First, the new inoculation message will inform participants that front groups 
generally stress individual rather than corporate responsibility for environmental 
clean-up or protection efforts.  Second, the RAN inoculation message will prompt 




 For example, the RAN inoculation treatment will direct readers to look for 
vague or ambiguous arguments or information in the front group messages.  As a 
further example, the front group National Wetlands Coalition makes vague 
references to positive sounding activities, but it is completely unclear what these 
efforts are.  In addition, the RAN inoculation messages will prompt individuals to 
pay careful attention to information that might be omitted from a stealth message 
that would be deceptive such as who might be funding the group or who might 
benefit from the efforts of the group. Finally, the RAN inoculation message will 
encourage participants to carefully consider whether the name of the group is a true 
representation of what the group stands for.  When compared to the standard 
inoculation messages used previously, the RAN inoculation treatment should 
provide individuals with a greater opportunity to identify vague or potentially 
misleading information and ultimately resist front group stealth messages.   
 Both the standard inoculation messages and the new RAN inoculation 
messages directly question the credibility of front groups.  In addition, the 
Robertson et al. (2010) research demonstrated that inoculated individuals assessed 
the credibility of front groups as lower than those who read control messages.  
Therefore it is predicted:  
H2: There is a significant difference in the perceived level of front group 
credibility such that individuals in the RAN inoculation condition report the 
lowest level of front group credibility, followed by individuals in the 




H3: There is a significant difference in the perceived level of front group 
deceptiveness such that individuals in the control condition report the 
lowest number of vague or misleading strategies, followed by individuals in 
the standard condition, followed by individuals in the RAN inoculation 
condition.   
To date, researchers have committed considerable attention to the factors 
that maximize the efficacy of inoculation research, however little research has 
explored the possible unanticipated consequences of inoculation.  It is possible that 
inoculation may contribute to resistance to front groups but given that inoculation 
message may elevate their suspicions about front groups, these suspicions may not 
be limited to front groups by may lead to the inaccurate classification of legitimate 
grass roots, political, or religious groups as front groups. Therefore the following 
research question is posed:  
RQ1: Do inoculation treatments lead to the incorrect evaluation of 
grassroots groups as front groups?  
 The bias hypothesis states that even if a person’s sufficiency threshold is 
met and they are motivated to carefully consider the quality of the arguments 
presented in a message, if they are unable to thoughtfully sort through a set of 
confusing information, then they are likely to revert back to heuristics in order to 
make their assessment about the message (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994).  
However, the RAN inoculation messages should help a motivated individual to 




omission as a strategy front groups use.  Because individuals assigned to the RAN 
condition should be more familiar with front group strategies, they should also 
engage in more systematic processing than the standard inoculation group or the 
control groups. 
  In addition, individuals assigned to the RAN conditions will receive more 
information to help prepare them to resist the later attack messages than the 
standard inoculation group or the control group. Johnson and Eagly (1989) note 
that “messages that elicit unfavorable thinking, increased message-relevant 
thinking should decrease persuasion” (p. 293). The participants in the RAN 
inoculation conditions are likely to have a greater motivation to carefully consider 
the merits of the front groups’ arguments.  Moreover, an investigation conducted 
by Walther, Van Der Heide, Tong, Carr, and Atkin (2010) determined that 
individuals who were motivated by disaffinity goals, engaged in more online 
information seeking about the discussion issue than individuals who were 
motivated by affinity goals.  In particular when participants were experimentally 
prompted to distance him or herself from a conversational partner were given an 
opportunity to search online for information to prepare for an impending 
interaction, they searched online for information about the partner’s preferences.   
 In this case, individuals who are assigned to inoculation conditions will be 
exposed to negative materials about front groups.  This negative information about 
the front groups should generate disaffinity toward front groups.  Chaiken and 




their desired confidence, they are motivated to systematically process information 
in order to become more confident in their judgments (Chaiken et al., 1996).  In 
addition, the HSM would predict that because motivated individuals are more 
likely to systematically process both inoculation message and attack messages than 
unmotivated people, they are also more likely to consider the merits of the 
arguments themselves rather than source characteristics.  Therefore, it is predicted: 
H4: Compared to controls, individuals who receive the standard 
inoculation will engage in significantly more heuristic processing to 
form their attitudes about front groups than individuals who receive 
RAN inoculation messages. 
H5: Individuals who receive RAN inoculation messages will report 
greater levels of threat, anger, counterarguing and resistance to front 
group stealth messages than individuals who receive standard 
inoculation messages or control messages. 
H6: Individuals in the RAN inoculation condition engage in 
significantly more relevant on-line information seeking behaviors 
than individuals in the standard inoculation condition, who in turn 
engage in significantly more relevant on-line information seeking 
than individuals in the control condition.   
H7: Individuals whose actual confidence in their ability to identify 
front groups is less than their desired confidence in their ability to 




engage in more systematic processing of the experimental messages, 
engage in more on-line information seeking behaviors and produce 
more counterarguing output than unmotivated individuals.   
Motivational Boosters  
 Resistance scholars credit threat as a motivational force behind the 
protection of ideas (Compton & Pfau, 2004).  However, Banas and Rains (2010) 
did not find a positive relationship between the amount of threat reported by 
participants and the level of resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion.  Moreover, 
they suggest that research explore the role of additional types of motivation in the 
resistance process.  The role of motivation in inoculation has been explored in other 
ways.  In particular, many scholars have investigated the role of involvement (Pfau, 
Banas, Semmler, Deatrick, Lane, Mason et al., 2010; Pfau, Tusing, Koerner, Lee, 
Goldbold, Penaloza et al., 1997; Pfau, Tusing, Lee, Godbold, Koerner, Penaloza et 
al., 1997), which Johnson and Eagly (1989) advance is “a motivational variable that 
is presumed to affect persuasion because it instigates more thorough processing of 
persuasive messages” (p. 290). However, Banas and Rains (2010) report in their 
meta-analytic review that the link between involvement and resistance is 
questionable.   
 One possible explanation for the lack of connection between the 
motivational variable of involvement to resistance, is that according to Insko 
(1967) motivational inductions are short lived.  To address the potential decline of 




existing beliefs with an additional reinforcing message administered between the 
inoculation message and the attack message called a booster message (Pfau, 
Compton, Parker, An, Wittenberg, Ferguson et al., 2006; Pfau & Van Bocken, 
1994; Pfau, Van Bocken, & Kang, 1992).   
 While the idea of the booster in inoculation theory is reasonable, extant 
research on the efficacy of booster sessions in inoculation experiments to bolster 
the level of resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion is mixed.  For example, Pfau 
and colleagues conduced an experiment to generate adolescent resistance to 
pressure to use tobacco products (Pfau, Van Bocken, 1994; Pfau, Van Bockern, & 
Kang, 1992).  In both studies the researcher noted that while the inoculation 
strategy was effective in producing resistance to smoking among adolescents with 
low self-esteem, no additional levels of resistance were observed among 
participants who were exposed to the booster messages.   
 Alternatively, Pfau, Compton, Parker, Wittenberg, Ferguson, Horton, and 
Malyshev (2006) found that individuals who had received a booster message in 
addition to an inoculation treatment produced more counterarguments over time 
than did individuals who received only an inoculation message.  There was one 
exception to this finding.  Participants who received an inoculation message that 
contained a preview of counterattitudinal attacks that were different from the 
arguments that came in the later attacks also produced a higher level of resistance 




counterattitudinal attacks that they would later be exposed to in the attack 
messages.   
 In a somewhat different approach to studying the efficacy of a booster, 
Ivanov, Pfau, and Parker (2009) suggested that the attack message itself would 
serve as a motivational booster that should lead to the protection of a desired 
attitude.  They reasoned that prior to an attack an individual might lack the 
motivation to engage in attitude protection until they actually encounter an attack 
on their attitudes.  While Ivanov and colleagues did not find support for a resistance 
boosting effect of an attack message, their move to look at a booster in a new light 
is important.  In particular, as stated previously, the exposure to additional 
information to support an existing belief may not provide any motivation of the 
individual to protect their existing attitude using this booster session material.  It 
may be that part of the mixed results in the booster session inoculation research is 
that the content of the booster sessions is what potentially diminished their efficacy.   
 Rather than to simply provide additional attitude supporting information, it 
is likely that if the booster session was a simple motivational induction that the 
participants would be more careful both to process the attack messages they would 
later encounter and they would also be motivated to protect their attitudes from the 
later attack.  Again if threat is the motivational catalyst behind resistance to 
counterattitudinal attacks, and motivational inductions are reduced over time 
(Insko, 1967), than perhaps all that is needed in a booster is an additional 




H8: There is an interaction effect between experimental condition 
and the motivational booster such that: Individual who receive the 
RAN inoculation message plus a motivational booster will report 
significantly less confidence in their ability to identify front groups 
than their desired confidence than any other condition.   
H9: There is an interaction effect between experimental condition and the 
motivational booster such that: Individuals in the RAN condition and the 
booster condition will report significantly more resistance to 





Chapter 3: Methods  
This investigation was designed to better understand why front group 
stealth messages are effective and how to bolster the efficacy of inoculation 
treatments so that they consistently confer resistance to deceptive stealth messages.  
To this end, this research completed minor revisions to the inoculation messages 
used in previous front group experiments (Pfau, et al., 2006; Robertson et al., 2010) 
and tested their efficacy compared to a newly designed inoculation RAN 
inoculation messages based on the research of the HSM (Chaiken, 1980).   
 This experimental comparison was designed to determine if participants 
engage in differential levels of message processing, seek additional on-line 
information about front-groups, have differential ability to identify false or 
misleading information in front group stealth messages, and resistance to front 
group stealth messages.  Furthermore, this research explored whether the addition 
of a motivational booster presented immediately prior to the front group attack 
message would lead participants to systematically process front group stealth 
messages, identify misleading information, and confer greater resistance to front 
group stealth messages than individuals who did not receive the motivational 
booster.   
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from the research pool in the Department of 
Communication at the University of Oklahoma.  A recruitment advertisement was 




research website.  The researcher reported the mean time it took for the participants 
to complete each phase of the study.  A total of 415 participants enrolled in Phase I 
of the study.  A total of 250 participants completed Phase II, which represents a 
retention rate of 60 percent.  A total of 226 participants completed all three phases 
of the study representing a retention rate of 96 percent between Phase II and Phase 
III.  Participants were 35.4 percent male and 63.8 percent female. When asked to 
specify their race, 76 percent indicated they were Caucasian, 5.6 percent reported 
they were African American, 3.6 percent  indicated they were Hispanic, .8 percent 
indicated they were Asian, .4 percent  indicated they were Native American, and 
2.8 percent indicated they were Pacific Islander.  
The demographic statistics reported in the Fall 2012 University of 
Oklahoma Norman Campus Enrollment Analysis report Table 1A demonstrate that 
the study sample generally reflects the Norman campus student population. In 
particular, 61.7 percent of the Norman Campus population are white, 4.4 percent 
are Native American, 5.1 percent are Asian, 5.0 percent are black, 6.7 percent are 
Hispanic, and .2 percent are Pacific Islander. The main differences were with Asian 
and Native American students. It may be that there systematic differences in the 
Communication research pool during this time that can explain the differences.  
Procedures 
 The study was conducted in three phases.  During Phase I, participants were 
instructed to complete a short on-line survey designed to assess the participants’ 




inoculation studies (Pfau et al., 2007; Robertson et al., 2010).  These issues 
included wetlands conservation, regulations on business to reduce the amount of 
litter their products produce, and mandatory recycling legislation.  Pfau and 
colleagues employed these issues because they are at the heart of stealth campaigns 
launched by “active” and established front groups (Pfau et al., 2007, p. 6). In 
addition to assessing attitudes about the above issues, participants’ level of 
involvement was measured.  Limited demographic information was collected 
including: participant sex, year in school, age, and race.  Finally, participants were 
asked to enter their email address so they could be contacted to participate in Phase 
II and Phase III of the study.  After the participants completed Phase I, they were 
emailed and asked to sign up for an appointment to completed Phase II of the 
study.  There was approximately one week between the time the participants 
complete Phase I of the study and began Phase II.   
 Prior to Phase II, participants were assigned to either a control condition or 
to one of the inoculation conditions on an issue they reported holding a favorable 
attitude.  At the beginning of Phase II participants arrived at the Message Analysis 
and Processing Lab (MAPL) in Burton Hall.  They were thanked for coming and 
were signed-in, asked to re-read the informed consent form and sign if they wanted 
to participate.  They were also given a copy of the University of Oklahoma Interim 
Internet Policy, which the Institutional Review Board suggested would be 
beneficial to distribute to students because their internet searching behaviors would 




Oklahoma Interim Internet Policy, the researcher or a lab assistant set up their 
research computer station.  Without the participant’s knowledge the Camtasia 
studio screen capturing software was opened while they read the preliminary 
materials.  After each participant read and signed the consent form and looked over 
the internet policy, they were instructed to carefully read and respond accurately 
respond to all the study materials.  The instructions were as follows:  
Before you begin this part of the study you should know that it is 
important that you carefully read and think about the information 
you are about to receive.  After you are finished here today, you will 
be asked about how you evaluated the information and what lead 
you to evaluate the message the way you did.  Your careful and 
candid responses are very important to the results of this study.  The 
computer will prompt you through this phase of the study, but if you 
have any questions, I will assist you.  Please read the messages on 
the computer screen and respond in the way that best represents your 
position.  When you are finished you will be asked about your 
decision-making. 
 
 Next, they were prompted to read a standard inoculation message, a RAN 
inoculation message, or a control message.  After the participants read the 
inoculation or control message, the dependent variables of threat, counterarguing 
output, message processing, and their time spent searching for additional on-line 
information about front-groups was assessed.  After the participants completed 
Phase II, they were asked to carefully read a partial debriefing form, which 
instructed them their on-line search had been captured with Camtasia software.  
They were given the opportunity to completely withdraw from the study, include 
their survey responses only, or to give their permission for the use of their survey 




nine requested their Camtasia data not be included in the study.  None of the 
participants requested withdrawing from the study after reading the partial debrief 
in Phase II.  The researcher or lab assistant then asked the participants several 
questions about what they read and what they thought about what they read.  
Finally, they were thanked and instructed that they would receive an email with the 
link to Phase III of the study.  
 Prior to Phase III, participants were randomly assigned to read a 
motivational booster immediately preceding the counterattitudinal attack message 
or to read only the counterattitudinal attack message.  The researcher then sent each 
participant an email which included a link to the Phase III survey. The mean delay 
between Phase II and Phase III was 5.38 days with a standard deviation of 3.49.  
 During Phase III, participant’s desired level of confidence in identifying a 
front group and their actual confidence in their ability to identify a front group were 
assessed.  Next, participants were asked to read a front-group stealth message, 
which attacks their position on the issue of protecting wetlands, or mandatory 
recycling and litter regulation.  Participants were also asked to complete posttest 
measures, which reassessed their attitudes toward and involvement with the issues.   
In addition, the posttest measures assessed participants’ level of accuracy 
motivation, evaluation of front-group source credibility, and message processing.  
Participants were then asked to determine if the message source is a front group 
and how confident they were that the source was a front group. Participants were 




rate the extent to which they thought the message was deceptive.  If they indicated 
that they believed the messages to be false, they were asked to isolate false or 
misleading statements within the stealth message.  Finally, to ensure that the 
inoculation messages do not have the unintended effect of making individuals 
suspicious of all grass roots organizations, participants were asked to determine if 
three additional groups are front groups.  All participants who completed Phase III 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  Of the 226 people who 
completed Phase III, only 4 asked that their data be excluded from the analysis.   
Message Construction 
Inoculation Messages  
Two types of inoculation messages were employed (Please see Appendix A 
for the standard inoculation messages, the RAN inoculation messages, and the 
control message).  First, the standard inoculation messages used in the two previous 
front group studies (Pfau et al., 2007; Robertson et al., 2010) were employed to 
forewarn participants of either Keep America Beautiful or the National Wetlands 
Coalition stealth messages.  Again, Pfau and colleagues justify the selection of 
these groups because they were active and operating front groups at the time of the 
initial study (Pfau et al., 2007).   
Next, the standard inoculation messages were adapted to create the RAN 
inoculation messages.  The RAN inoculation message adaptations included a 
primary focus on front group strategies such as how front groups encourage 




corporations can do to help accomplish the stated environmental goals.  In addition 
the RAN inoculation messages highlighted the poor argument quality or vagueness 
of the arguments presented by front groups.  Participants were also encouraged to 
carefully consider what information was omitted from stealth messages, and that 
front groups are skilled at the use of subtle tactics that if not carefully scrutinized 
can be very influential.  Both the standard and the RAN inoculation messages were 
designed to generate threat by warning the participants that it was likely that they 
would encounter front groups messages and they were likely to be so persuasive 
that they could potential lead them to change their attitudes about the issues (Pfau 
et al., 2007).   
Motivational Booster 
The booster was designed to motivate participants to carefully process the 
persuasive front group attack messages (Please See Appendix C: Motivational 
Booster). The motivational booster attempted to motivate participants in two ways.  
First, the message informed the participants that the researcher will personally ask 
them questions after they complete the on-line survey to understand their decision-
making processes.  In addition, the motivational booster informed participants that 
many of their peers make incorrect decisions and prompts them to be very careful 
to make correct decisions and employers are looking for sound decision-makers.  
The motivational booster is not specifically related to front-group messages 




an existing belief are generally not effective (Pfau, Van Bocken, 1994; Pfau, Van 
Bockern, & Kang, 1992). 
Front Group Stealth Attack Messages 
The stealth messages used by Pfau and colleagues (2007) were adapted to 
resemble public relations releases from the National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) 
and Keep America Beautiful (KAB) (Please see Appendix B: Attack Messages).  
NWC is a front-group supported by development companies, gas and oil 
companies, and mining companies (Environmental Working Group, 2007).  The 
NWC message suggested that they were in agreement that wetlands needed to be 
preserved, but that legislation might be too strong and inflexible of a response.  
Because the NWC might seem very balanced in their approach, they will likely be 
very persuasive even to someone who is in favor of environmental conservation.  
The previous front group studies found these messages to be persuasive (Pfau et al., 
2007; Robertson et al., 2010).   
 Alternatively, Keep America Beautiful is an organization that outwardly 
promotes clean-up projects while simultaneously shielding companies who would 
be negatively affected by cigarette litter regulations (Lamb, 2001).  The Keep 
America Beautiful message stresses the need for individual responsibility and 
community clean-up efforts rather than unnecessary government interference.  
Again, the previous studies have found this message to be persuasive.  Please see 





Attitudes Toward Issues  
The participant’s attitudes toward wetlands preservation as well as litter and 
recycling regulations was measured by employing the Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, and 
Montgomery (1978) attitude measure, a six item semantic differential scale used in 
both previous front-group studies and produced highly reliable results (Pfau et al., 
2007; Robertson et al., 2010).  The response options ranged from 1-7. The 
reliability of these items was analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  The 
reliability of the attitude measure was very good with an alpha of .94.   
Involvement 
This investigation employed six items from the Personal Involvement 
Inventory (PII) (Zaichkowsky, 1985) which were used to assess participant 
involvement on the issue of wetlands preservation and mandatory litter and 
recycling regulation.  The PII is a 7-point bipolar adjective scale used in both front-
group studies (Pfau et al., 2007; Robertson et al., 2010).  For the mandatory 
recycling legislation the item appeared as follows: “How important is the issue of 
national bottle and can recycling legislation.” The measure will include the 
following: unimportant-important, of no concern-of much concern, means nothing-
means a lot, doesn’t matter-matters to me, insignificant-significant, and irrelevant-
relevant.  The reliability of these items was analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient.  The reliability of the involvement measure was also very good with an 





In order to assess participants’ perceived threat that they will encounter 
front groups that is so persuasive that may change their mind about the issues in 
question, this investigation used the five bipolar adjective pairs employed in 
previous inoculation studies (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau et al., 2007) to assess 
threat.  The scale items included: safe-dangerous, not harmful-harmful, 
nonthreatening-threatening, unintimidating-intimidating, and not risky-risky.  The 
reliability of these items was analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  The 
reliability of the threat measure was very good with an alpha of .94.   
Anger 
In order to assess participants’ level of anger toward front groups for using 
stealth messages designed to deceive them, three items from Dillard, Plotnick, 
Godbold, Freimuth, and Edgar’s (1996) anger scale were used.  The responses were 
assessed on a 7-point scale.  Participants who report higher scores indicated 
stronger feelings of anger.  Items include: I feel angry that a front group will try to 
deceive me; I feel annoyed that a front group will try to deceive me; and I feel 
aggravated that a front group will try to deceive me.  The reliability of these items 
was analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  The reliability of the anger 
measure was good with an alpha of .90. 
Counterarguing  
In order to assess counterarguing, a three-step process employed by Pfau et 




arguments that may be contrary to their attitudes about either limiting the 
development of wetlands or litter regulations.  Second, after identifying the 
possible counterattitudinal attacks, participants were instructed to think of a 
response to each attack.  Third, participants were asked to assess the quality of both 
the arguments and the counterarguments they produced using a 7-point rating 
system with 7 being a very strong argument and 1 being a very weak argument.   
 Following the procedure of Pfau and colleagues (2007), counterarguing 
output was computed by first multiplying the total number of challenging 
arguments by the average quality rating of their arguments and subtracting this 
score by the product of the total number of responding arguments multiplied by the 
argument quality.  The overall mean counterarguing output was 3.34 with a 
standard deviation of 8.66.   
 Message Processing 
Message processing was assessed both in Phase II and in Phase III of the 
experiment.  In order to assess message processing, a thought listing procedure 
used by Chaiken (1980) was used.  In particular, participants were given three 
minutes to write down any thoughts they may have about the inoculation message 
and the attack messages they read.  The participants’ responses to a three-minute 
timed throught-listing activity in both Phase II and Phase III were coded to asses 
message processing.  Two trained coders evaluated 20% of the participants’ 
responses to a three-minute timed thought-listing activity for Phase II using a 




The responses were coded into systematic thoughts, heuristic thoughts, or 
unrelated thoughts.  In particular, participants’ who listed thoughts and feelings 
about the message such as remarks about the quality of arguments and front group 
tactics were coded as systematic.  For example, “I think this organization tries to 
deceive people by presenting positive messages and making them look like good 
things when in fact they simply started this organization to put the blame on 
everyone else.” Alternatively, participants whose comments were about the source 
of the message of the information were coded as heuristically processing.  For 
example “The National Wetlands Coalition is such a joke.” Finally, comments such 
as “I also feel like I have been waiting on this screen for longer than three 
minutes...” were coded as unrelated thoughts.   
Percent agreement scores and a Scott’s Pi test were calculated using ReCall 
to determine intercoder reliability (Freelon, 2010).  Of the 61 participants’ 
responses coded for Phase II, the coders reached percent agreement scores ranging 
from 45.45 percent to 100 percent.  The mean agreement score was 90.15 percent 
indicating a strong overall percent agreement between the coders.  The Scott’s Pi 
scores for the Phase II coding ranged from 6 to 100 percent.  The mean Scott’s Pi 
score was .83 indicating acceptable agreement between the coders.  Of the 58 
participant’s responses from Phase III, the coders reached percent agreement scores 
ranging from 62.5 percent to 100.  While 62.5 percent was the lowest score, the 
mean percent agreement score was 95.04 percent demonstrating strong agreement 




several times to resolve coding disagreements. The Scott’s Pi scores for the 58 
participant’s responses ranged from .38 to 1.  Again, while .38 was the lowest 
agreement score, the mean Scott’s Pi score was .91 also demonstrating strong 
agreement between coders, which was also improved with several meetings to 
resolve coding disagreements.  
On-line Information-seeking 
During Phase II participants were prompted to conduct a 10 minute timed 
on-line search to look for additional information about the experimental or control 
messages.  A Google search page was open behind the survey page on each of the 
research stations for ease of use.  Unbeknownst to the participants, Camtasia 
software was installed on each research station and captured their on-line searches 
in a video recording of the computer screen.  Camtasia software was used 
effectively in a previous information-seeking experiment (Walther, Heide, Tong, 
Carr, & Atkin, 2010).   
Two trained coders evaluated 20 percent of the participants’ recordings.  In 
particular, the coders examined each search to determine the relevance of the 
search.  For example, “how to stop front groups such as Keep America Beautiful” 
was coded as a relevant search, while “I’m feeling trendy” or a Facebook session 
were coded as irrelevant searches.  Percent agreement scores and a Scott’s Pi test 
were calculated using ReCall to determine intercoder reliability (Freelon, 2010).  
Of the 48 participants’ search, the coders reached percent agreement scores ranging 




indicating a strong overall percent agreement between the coders.  The Scott’s Pi 
scores for the Phase II coding ranged from -.07 to 1.  The mean Scott’s Pi score 
was .81 indicating acceptable agreement between the coders and differences were 
resolved with discussion. 
Accuracy Motivation 
To measure accuracy motivation, three items were employed.  These 7-
point Likert-type items included: To what extent is it important to you to accurately 
identify a front group?; To what extent is it relevant to you to know if a message 
you hear or read is from a front group?; and to what extent does it matter to you 
that you are able to identify front groups when you encounter them? The reliability 
of these items was analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  The reliability of 
these items was good with an alpha of .91.   
Sufficiency Principle  
In order to assess participant’s motivation to systematically process the 
experimental messages, desired confidence and actual confidence (Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991) were assessed.  First, a single 7-point item adapted from 
Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) were employed to assess participants’ desired 
confidence that they would not be influenced by front group stealth messages.  A 
score of one represents a very low desire for confidence while a score of seven 
represents a strong desire for confidence.  Second, a single item was employed to 
assess the participants’ actual confidence that they would not be influenced by front 




while a score of seven represents very strong actual confidence.  A sufficiency 
composite score was then calculated by subtracting actual confidence from desired 
confidence. Participants who report a strong desired confidence but a low actual 
confidence demand high sufficiency, while participants who report a weak desire 
for confidence and high actual confidence should demand low sufficiency and little 
motivation for accuracy (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).    
Front Group Source Credibility 
In order to assess the credibility of the message sources, six items from 
McCroskey’s (1966) credibility scale was used.  Example items from the 
authoritativeness scale include: “reliable/unreliable,” “informed/uninformed,” and 
“qualified/unqualified” (p. 72). The reliability of this scale was good with an alpha 
of .82.  In order to assess the character of the message source, six items from 
McCroskey’s (1966) character scale were employed.  Example items include: 
“honest/dishonest,” “pleasant/unpleasant,” and “friendly/unfriendly.” The 
reliability of all of these scales were analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  
The reliability of these items were good with an alpha of .89.  Finally, in order to 
assess the message source’s perceived caring, nine items from Teven and 
McCroksey’s (1997) ethos scale were used (See Teven & McCroskey, 1996, p. 4). 
Items were adapted from Teven and McCroskey caring scales.  Example items for 
Keep America Beautiful are:  Keep America Beautiful cares about me/doesn’t care 
about me; Keep America Beautiful has my interests at heart/doesn’t have my 




companies they serve/not only focused on themselves and the companies they 
serve; Keep America Beautiful is unconcerned with me/concerned with me; Keep 
America Beautiful is insensitive/sensitive; Keep America Beautiful is 
empathetic/apathetic; Keep America Beautiful is understanding/not understanding; 
Keep America Beautiful is unresponsive/responsive; Keep America Beautiful 
understands how I feel/doesn’t understand how I feel; Keep America Beautiful 
doesn’t understand how I think/understands how I think.  These items were adapted 
in the same format for the National Wetlands Coalition.  All of the items described 
above were presented as five-point semantic differential scales.  The reliability of 
these items was good with an alpha of .87.   
Accuracy in Judging a Front Group 
After participants read the front group stealth message in Phase III they 
were tested on their ability to identify the source of the counterattitudinal attack 
message as front group. The item was presented as follows: “The groups 
responsible for the message I just read is a front group” (yes or no).  71.2 percent of 
the respondents identified the source of the counterattitudinal attack message as a 
front group, while 19.2 percent indicated the source was not a front group. In 
addition, participants were asked to specify how confident they are in their 
classification of the message source.  The confidence scale was 1-100 with a score 
of one meaning that the participant is not at all confident in their classification and 
a score of 100 meaning they are completely confident that that they have accurately 




Identification of False Statements 
In order to assess the ability of participants to identify false or misleading 
statements within the front-group stealth messages, participants were asked to 
assess the truthfulness of the stealth message on a scale of one to ten 
(Meantruthfulness= 3.87, SD=1.42).  If they indicated anything other than a completely 
honest assessment, participants were asked indicate what portions of the attack 
message they believed to be a clue that the source was a front group and why that 
part of the message leads them to believe they were a front group. The mean 
number of clues isolated by the participants was 4.05 with a standard deviation of 
3.36.   
Resistance 
In order to assess resistance, the researcher examined if there were 
significant differences in attitudes during Phase III between the standard 
inoculation conditions, RAN inoculation conditions, and control conditions.  
Participants who received the RAN inoculation messages should have the highest 
attitude scores, followed by those assigned to the standard inoculation group, and 
participants in the control condition.  In order to calculate resistance, time two 
attitude was subtracted from time three attitude. This procedure was recently 
employed by Miller, Ivanov, Sims, Compton, Harrison et al., (2013). This 
procedure calculates attitude change between Phase I to Phase III. Those in the 





Unintended Inoculation Effects 
In order to determine if the inoculation messages make participants 
suspicious of other organizations, the participants will be given the description of 
three additional groups including the Family Research Council, the Sierra Club, 
and the Center for Consumer Freedom.  The descriptions that participants were 
given to read about these organizations were taken directly from their 
organizational websites (Center for Consumer Freedom; 1997; Family Research 
Council, 2012; Sierra Club, 2012).  The first two groups are legitimate interest 
groups while the third is a front group. After participants read the description for 
each group they were tested on their ability to identify the source accurately.  For 
example “The Family Research Council is a front group” (yes or no).  In addition, 
participants were asked to specify how confident they were in their classification of 
the message source on a scale of 1-100 with a score of one meaning that the 
participant is not at all confident in their classification and a score of 100 meaning 




Chapter 4: Results  
This investigation explored the possible reasons why front group stealth 
messages are effective and how to bolster the efficacy of inoculation treatments so 
they consistently confer resistance to deceptive stealth messages.  Chapter Four 
presents the data cleaning, the manipulations check, and the results of the 
hypothesis testing.   
An examination of the counterarguing variable revealed that at least one of 
the participants likely held attitudes about recycling or conservation that are 
inconsistent with the population of interest. Therefore the single participant was 
excluded from the analysis because the content of their counteraguments were 
contrary to the attitude they reported during the Phase I survey.  Perhaps they were 
unclear about their opinions during the Phase I measurement or they misunderstood 
the counterarguing activity, but either way their reported attitudes were opposite of 
their counterarguments and thus their counterarguing score was eliminated. The 
following analyses began by first looking at potential differences between the RAN 
and standard inoculation groups. If there are no differences between those groups 
on the level of accuracy and confidence a further analysis was conducted to 
determine if collapsing both the RAN and standard inoculation conditions into a 
single treatment condition would reveal any differences than individuals in the 
control groups. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients between the main 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Manipulation Check  
 Threat and counterarguing output are considered to be the foundational 
elements of inoculation experimental treatments (Pfau et al., 2007).  More recently 
Ivanov et al. (2011) added anger as an additional central motivational variable.  
Therefore MANOVA was performed on threat, anger, and counterarguing output 
for the manipulation check.  The independent variable was a combination of both 
the RAN and the standard inoculation treatment to determine if the treatments had 
the theoretically predicted influence on threat and counterarguing. Because this 
study is somewhat exploratory in nature because it has employed new 
manipulations to inoculation theory in the form of the RAN messages, Rosenthal, 
Rosnow, and Rubin’s (2000) recommendation to report the actual significance level 
even if it is greater than .05 will be employed for interpreting the results. Rosenthal 
and colleagues advance that the “sharp line between ‘significant’ and ‘non-
significant’” findings are without warrant and call for the reporting of the exact p 
value because significance “varies continuously between extremes” (p. 5). 
Therefore, in the present study all p values will be reported and those less than .10 
will be interpreted as significant.  
With Wilks’ Lambda as the criteria, the overall model was significant F(3, 
159)=2.97, p = .03, partial 
2
=.05.  The results reveal as expected that individuals 
in the treatment conditions generate significantly more counterarguments F(1, 
161)=3.04, p = .08, 
2
=.02  and anger F(1, 161)=5.29, p = .02, 
2
=.03 than 




were no significant differences between the inoculation groups and the control 
group on the level of threat F(1, 161)=2.15, p = .14, 
2
=.01, however, the means 








Table 2. Mean Comparisons for Inoculation Manipulation Check  
Experimental Condition 
 Inoculation Control 
Dependent 
Measures  
M (SD) n M (SD) n 
Threat 3.72 1.51 123 3.30 1.33 40 
Anger  **5.30 1.36 123 4.73 1.31 40 
Counterarguing 
Output 
*4.37 9.14 123 1.51 8.66 40 
** Means are significantly higher than the control condition (p= .02).  
 






Hypothesis one predicted that inoculated individuals report more threat, 
generate more counterargument, and are more resistant to counterattitudinal 
persuasion than controls.  In order to test hypothesis one, a MANOVA was 
performed on the dependent variables threat, counterarguing output, and resistance 
to counterattitudinal persuasion (attitude change between Phase I and Phase III).  
The independent variable was inoculation (inoculation, control).   
With Wilks’ Lambda as the criteria, the overall model was not significant 
F(3, 144)=1.96, p=.12, 
2
=.04.  However, an examination of the between subject 
results revealed a significant difference in the level of threat between individuals in 
the inoculation combined inoculation condition and those in the control condition 
F(1, 146)=3.11, p=.08, 
2
=.02.  While this finding is different than what was 
revealed by the manipulation check, it is likely that the list wise deletion function 
within SPSS eliminated participants in the present analysis because unlike the 
manipulation check, this analysis spanned Phase II and Phase III of the study. As a 
result, if there were any people who completed Phase II but not Phase III, their data 
would have been excluded.  
 Individuals in the inoculation condition generate significantly more 
counterarguments than controls F(1,46)=2.96, p=.09, 
2 
= .02.  Finally, there is no 
evidence that inoculated individuals report less attitude change after exposure to 





<.01 (see Table 3 for mean comparisons), although the means were in the predicted 










Table 3. Mean Comparisons for Hypothesis One  
Experimental Condition 
 Inoculation Control 
Dependent Measures  M (SD) n M (SD) n 
Threat *3.75 1.52 110 3.26 1.31 38 
Counterarguing 
Output 
*4.31 9.41 110 1.32 8.77 38 
Resistance  .02 1.00 110 -.06 1.07 38 





The second hypothesis predicted a significant difference in the level of front 
group credibility such that individuals in the RAN inoculation condition report the 
lowest level of front group credibility, followed by individuals in the standard 
inoculation, followed by individuals in the control condition.  In order the test the 
second hypothesis, a MANOVA as performed on the dependent variables which 
together make up source credibility: character, caring, and expertise.  The 
independent variable was inoculation (RAN inoculation, standard inoculation, 
control).   
 With Wilks’ as the criteria, the overall model was significant F(6, 348) 
=1.82, p = .09, partial 
2 
=.03.  An examination of the between subjects results 
revealed a significant difference in the level of perceived character of the attack 
message source F(2,176) =3.37, p =.04, 
2 
=.04.  An examination of the LSD 
multiple comparison test revealed that contrary to what was predicted, only 
individuals in the standard inoculation condition perceived front group character to 
be significantly less than those in the control condition p =.01.  Therefore, there is 
no evidence that individuals in the RAN inoculation condition have significantly 
lower evaluations of character than individuals in the standard inoculation 
condition (p= .44) or the control condition (p=.13) (see Table 4 for mean 
comparisons).   
 An examination of a between subject results revealed no between groups 






However, the results of the LSD multiple comparison tests revealed a significant 
difference between individuals in the standard inoculation condition and control 
condition on the level of caring (p=.051).  Those in the RAN inoculation condition 
also perceived the front groups to be less caring than did individuals in the control 
condition (p= .08).  There were no difference between individuals in the standard 
and RAN inoculation conditions on perceptions of front group caring (p=.90) (see 
Table 3 for mean comparisons).  Finally, the results of the omnibus test revealed no 
significant differences in perceived front group expertise F(2,176)=.35, p=.71, 

2
<.01 (see Table 4 for mean comparisons).  Taken together there was no support 

























































































































































































































































































































































Hypothesis three predicted a significant difference in the perceived front 
group deceptiveness such that individuals in the control condition report the lowest 
number of vague or misleading strategies and lowest ratings of truthfulness, 
followed by individuals in the standard condition, followed by individuals in the 
RAN condition.  In order to test the third hypothesis a MANOVA was conducted 
with inoculation (RAN, standard, control) as the independent variable and number 
of clues identified in the front group stealth messages and front group truthfulness 
rating as the dependent variable.   
Although the means were in the predicted direction, the results of the 
MANOVA were not significant F(4,336)=.47, p=.76, 
2
=.01 (see Table 5 for mean 
comparisons).  There is no support for the conclusion that individuals in the RAN 
condition identify more vague or misleading strategies F(2,169)=.53, p=.59, 
2
=.01 
nor lower ratings of truthfulness F(2,169)=.45, p=.64, 
2
=.01 than did those in the 




































































































































































































































































































































Despite the lack of evidence to support hypothesis three, it is likely that 
there are a number of between group differences in evaluations of front groups. 
Therefore a number of additional analyses were conducted to determine the 
accuracy of classifying the attack message source and participants’ confidence that 
their classifications were accurate. The following analyses began by first looking at 
potential differences between the RAN and standard inoculation groups. If there are 
no differences between those groups on the level of accuracy and confidence a 
further analysis was conducted to determine if collapsing both the RAN and 
standard inoculation conditions into a single treatment condition would reveal any 
differences compared to individuals in the control groups.  
To determine if individuals assigned to the RAN inoculation conditions 
were more accurate at correctly classifying the source of the attack message as a 
front group than individuals in the standard inoculation group and the control 
group, a Chi-Square analysis was conducted. The results of the Chi-Square test 
were not significant.  The results reveal that individuals in the RAN condition were 
not more accurate in their classification of truthfulness than individuals in the 
standard inoculation or the control condition Χ
2 
(2, N=246) =3.44, p= .18.  While 
the results of the test were not significant, the accuracy percentages were in the 
predicted direction.  Individuals in the RAN condition accurately classified the 
message sources as a front group 84 percent of the time, individuals in the standard 
condition accurately classified the source 82 percent of the time, and individuals in 




Further analysis was conducted to determine if individuals in a combined 
inoculation condition were more accurate in their classification of the message 
source as a front group Χ
2 
(1, N=246) = 4.35, p=.04 than controls.  Indeed, 
individuals in the inoculation conditions made accurate classifications 83 percent of 
the time while those in the control condition made accurate classifications 69 
percent of the time. 
To determine if individual in the inoculation conditions reported more 
confidence in their classification of the message source as a front group or not, an 
ANOVA was performed on the dependent variable evaluation confidence.  The 
independent variable was inoculation (standard, RAN, control).  The overall model 
was significant F(2,178)=3.90, p=.02, 
2
=.04, revealing that individuals in the 
RAN inoculation conditions were significantly more confident they had correctly 
classified the message source as a front group than controls ( p=.02, MRAN=71.56, 
SD=22.22; MControl=60.04, SD=23.69).  Individuals in the standard inoculation 
conditions were also more confident that they had correctly classified the message 
source as a front group (p=.01, MStandard=69.64, SD=18.97; MControl=60.04, 
SD=23.69).  There were no difference between the RAN and standard inoculation 
group’s confidence (p=.64).   
Research Question One 
Research question one was posed to determine if individuals in the 
combined inoculation conditions become overly suspicious toward legitimate 




test this research question a Chi-square test was conducted with inoculation 
(treatment, control) as the independent variable and judgment accuracy for three 
different message sources (The Family Research Council, the Sierra Club, and 
Citizens for Consumer Freedom) as the dependent variables.  The results of the 
Chi-Square test revealed no significant difference in accuracy classifications 
between individuals in the inoculation and control conditions Χ
2 
(1, N=183) =.01, 
p=.91.  Individuals in the inoculation condition accurately classified the Family 
Research Council as a non-front group 59 percent of the time and individuals in the 
control condition accurately classified the group 58 percent of the time.   
The results of the Chi-Square test also revealed no significant differences in 
accuracy classifications of the Sierra Club between individuals in the inoculation 
condition and those in the control condition Χ
2 
(1, N=183)= .44, p=.51.  Individuals 
in the inoculation condition accurately classified the Sierra Club as a non-front 
group 64 percent of the time and individuals in the control condition accurately 
classified the group 58 percent of the time.  The results of the Chi-Square test did 
reveal significant differences in accuracy classifications for the Center for 
Consumer Freedom between individuals in the combined inoculation condition and 
those in the control condition Χ
2 
(1, N=182) = 3.26, p=.07.  Individuals in the 
inoculation condition accurately classified the Center for Consumer Freedom as a 
front group 69 percent of the time and individuals in the control condition 
accurately classified the group only 54 percent of the time.   




confident in their classifications of the Family Research Council, the Sierra Club, 
and the Center for Consumer Freedom as a front group or not, a MANOVA was 
performed on the dependent variables evaluation confidence for each group. The 
independent variable was combined inoculation (treatment, control).  With Wilks’ 
Lambda as the criteria, the overall model was not significant F(3,177)=.35, p=.56, 

2
=.002.  The results revealed no significant differences in the level of confidence 
for the Family Research Council F(1,179)=.35, p=.56, 
2
<.01, the Sierra Club 
F(1,179)=.01, p=.91, 
2
<.01, or the Center for Consumer freedom F(1,179)=.68, 
p=.41, 
2
<.01.  It appears that even when the individuals in the inoculation 
condition were more accurate in classifying the Center for Consumer Freedom as a 
front group than those in the control condition, there is no data to demonstrate they 
have more confidence in the accuracy of their assessments than those in the control 
condition.   
A critic of the study design might challenge the fact that there were two 
non-front groups and only one front group. They might argue that a better design 
would have included two non-front groups and two-front groups. However, 
Chronbach (1942) demonstrated through experimental testing that that when 
designing a true-false examination, it is better to “Use more false items than true 
items to increase reliability and validity” (p. 414). Applied to the present research, 
participants were asked to determine if for example, the Family Research Council 
was a front group or not. Their first choice was “Yes, the Family Research Council 




is not a front group.” In this case, the correct answer would be “No,” which is 
essentially parallel to “False.” For the second group, the Sierra Club, the correct 
answer was also “No.” The last group, Center for Consumer Freedom is a front 
group and therefore the correct answer was “Yes.” In this case the design conforms 
to the Cronbach’s recommendations to use more items in which false is correct than 
true.  
Hypothesis Four 
Hypothesis four predicted that compared to controls, individuals who 
receive the original inoculation engage in significantly more heuristic processing 
than individuals who receive RAN inoculation messages.  In order to test the fourth 
hypothesis a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with inoculation (RAN, 
standard, control) as the independent variable and message processing in Phase I 
and Phase II as the dependent time variables.   
The multivariate results were not significant F(2,154) =.31, p=.73, partial 

2
<.01.  It appears that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
inoculation condition (RAN, standard, control) differentially influenced message 
processing within participants from Phase II and Phase III.  There was also no 
between subjects differences in message processing F(2,154)=1.89, p=.15, 
2
=.02  
(see Table 6 for mean comparisons) although the means for Phase II and Phase III 
























































































































































































































Hypothesis Five  
The fifth hypothesis predicted that individuals who receive RAN 
inoculation messages will report greater levels of threat, anger, counterarguing and 
resistance to front group stealth messages than individuals who receive original 
inoculation messages or control messages.  In order to test hypothesis five, a 
multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the dependent variables: threat, 
counterarguing output, Phase II anger, and resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion.  The independent variable was inoculation type (RAN, standard, 
control).  With the Wilks’ criteria, the overall model was significant F(8, 
280)=1.86, p= .07, partial 
2
=.05. 
The between subjects test supported the prediction that inoculation type 
made a significant difference for threat F(2,143)=2.48, p=.09, 
2 
= .04.  An 
examination of the LSD post hoc test revealed significant differences between 
individuals in the RAN inoculation condition and those in the control condition 
(p=.03).  The post hoc test revealed no difference in the level of threat between 
individuals assigned to the RAN conditions and the standard inoculation condition 
(p=.26).  There is also no evidence that individuals in the standard inoculation 
experienced more threat than individuals in the control condition (p=.16) although 
the means were in the predicted direction (see Table 7 for mean comparisons).   
The between subject test did not support the prediction that inoculation type 
made a significant difference for anger toward front groups F(2,143)=2.39, p=.10, 

2 




individuals in the standard inoculation condition reported more anger toward front 
groups than those in the in the control condition (p=.03).  There was no evidence 
that individuals in the RAN condition experienced more anger than individuals in 
the control condition (p=.12).  The post hoc test also revealed no difference in the 
level of anger between individuals assigned to the RAN conditions and the standard 
inoculation condition (p=.72) (see Table 7 for mean comparisons).   
An examination of the between subject results revealed a significant 
difference between inoculation type on counterarguing output F(2, 143)=3.13, 
p=.05, 
2 
= .04.  Examination of LSD post hoc tests revealed that individuals who 
received the improved RAN message produced significantly more counterarguing 
output than individuals in the control condition (p=.01).  There was no evidence to 
conclude that individuals in the RAN inoculation condition generated more 
counterarguments than individuals in the standard inoculation condition (p=.10).  
Finally, there was no evidence that those in the standard condition generated more 
counterarguing than controls although the means were in the predicted direction 
(p=.24).   
 Inoculation type was not significant for resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion (Phase I attitude subtracted from Phase III attitude) F(2, 143)=.21, p= 
.81, 
2 
<.01 (see Table 7 for mean comparisons).  Examination of LSD post hoc 
test revealed no evidence of differences between individuals in the RAN 
inoculation condition and individuals in the control condition (p=.55).  No 




condition and those in the control condition for resistance (p=.87) although the 














































































































































































































































































































































Hypothesis six predicted that individuals in the RAN inoculation condition 
would engage in significantly more relevant on-line information seeking behaviors 
than individuals in the standard inoculation condition, who in turn would engage in 
significantly more relevant on-line information seeking than individuals in the 
control condition.  In order to test this hypothesis an ANOVA was performed on 
the dependent variable of message related on-line searches.  The independent 
variable was inoculation (standard, RAN, control).   
The results of the ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the amount 
of relevant on-line information seeking behaviors F(2,119)=3.56, p=.03, 
2 
= .06 
(see Table 8 for mean comparisons).  An examination of the results of the LSD 
multiple comparison test revealed that individuals in the RAN condition engaged in 
significantly fewer relevant on-line searches than individuals in the standard 
inoculation condition (p=.04).  In addition individual in the RAN condition 
engaged in significantly fewer relevant on-line searches than individuals in the 
control condition (p=.01).  There were no difference in the number of relevant on-
line searches between individuals in the standard inoculation condition and the 
control condition (p=.36) (see Table 8 for mean comparisons).   
While these results appear to be the opposite of what was predicted, they 
are not.  During the 10 minutes of searching individuals in the RAN condition 
searched fewer sites.  However, if the majority of their 10 minutes of on-line search 




conducted fewer searches they were likely to get more information than an 
individual who typed in 10 search strings and read only a few words on each page, 
even if those pages were relevant.  
In order to test the likelihood that individuals who typed in more search 
strings spent less time within actual webpages to gather information, a sample of 25 
videos were re-reviewed. To determine length of possible engagement with the 
information, the researcher used a timer to document the length of time each 
participant spent inside a webpage. As soon as the participant began typing in 
another search string, the researcher stopped the timer. The total time spent within 
the webpages was then recorded. A Person’s r correlation was computed to test the 
expectation that there is an inverse relationship between the number of search 
strings and the total time the participant spent on the webpages. The results 
revealed support for this prediction. It appears that as a person types in more and 
more search strings, they have less overall time to spend reading the content within 
the webpages they actually open r= -.552 , p=.004. Therefore hypothesis six was 



















































































































































































































































Hypothesis seven predicted that individuals whose actual confidence in 
their ability to identify front groups is less than their desired confidence in their 
ability to identify front groups and who have greater accuracy motivation to 
identify front group stealth messages engage in more relevant on-line information 
seeking behaviors than unmotivated individuals.  In order to assess hypothesis six, 
the number of relevant on-line searches were regressed on the level of accuracy 
motivation and sufficiency.  The regression analysis revealed that neither the 
sufficiency principle nor accuracy motivation predicted relevant on-line 
information seeking behaviors r
2 
= .013 (adjusted r
2
 <.01), F(2,141)=.94, p=.39.  







Table 9. Regression Results for Relevant Searches from the Sufficiency 
Principle and Accuracy Motivation  
Variables Relevant 
Searches 
Sufficiency Accuracy b β 
Sufficiency .08 1.00 .24 .162 .102 
Accuracy -.06 .24 1.00 -.215 -.08 
Intercept = 4.46     
Means 3.64 2.08 5.40  R2 =.014 
SD 3.12 1.98 1.18  R2adj
 
<.01 







Hypothesis eight predicted an interaction effect between experimental 
condition and the motivational booster such that: Individual who receive the RAN 
message plus a motivational booster report significantly less confidence in their 
ability to identify front groups than desired confidence than any other experimental 
condition.   
In order to test the hypothesis eight a 3 (standard inoculation, RAN 
inoculation, control) x 2 (booster, control) factorial analysis of variance was 
conducted on the dependent variable accuracy motivation.  The results revealed no 
interaction effect between inoculation type and motivational booster on the level of 
accuracy motivation F(2,169)=.93, p=.40, 
2 
= .01.  A Tukey’s post hoc test was 
conducted comparing the RAN inoculation treatment plus booster to all other 
conditions on the dependent variable sufficiency principle. The results were not 
significant. There is no evidence of an interaction effect between inoculation type 
and motivation booster on accuracy motivation.  Hypothesis eight was not 
supported.   
Hypothesis Nine 
The ninth hypothesis predicated an interaction effect between inoculation 
condition and the booster conditions such that individuals in the RAN condition are 
more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasion than individuals who receive any 
other treatment combination.  In order to test hypothesis eight, a 3 (Ran, standard, 




dependent variable resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion.   
 The results of the factorial ANOVA revealed no significant interaction 
between the inoculation message type and the presence of absence of a booster 
message F(2, 154) = .68, p = .51, 
2 
<.01.  A Tukey’s post hoc test was conducted 
comparing the RAN inoculation treatment plus booster to all other conditions on 
the level of resistance or attitude change from Phase I and Phase III. The results 





Chapter 5: Discussion 
Front group stealth messages have the potential to muddy the waters of 
important political issues as well as manipulate information about consumer and 
environmental safety. Healthy discourse about important issues is undermined 
when politicians, corporations, or special interest groups hide behind front groups. 
This investigation was not the first to point out the troubling persuasive potential of 
front group stealth messages. A series of investigations conducted by Pfau et al. 
(2007) and Robertson and colleagues (2010) explored the potential of the 
inoculation strategy for reducing the influence of deceptive front group messages.  
Pfau and colleagues found that inoculation was an effective strategy for 
conferring resistance to deceptive front group stealth messages; however Robertson 
et al (2010) failed to replicate these results. Pfau and colleagues suggested that 
front groups are persuasive because individuals fail to systematically process all of 
the important message-related features that may call attention to the discrepancies 
between the names of the groups and the positions they hold. As a result it is likely 
that front groups are persuasive because individuals draw on heuristic cues to 
process their messages. This explanation is consistent with the HSM, but they did 
not test it. Robertson et al. (2010) noted this gap as an area for additional research 
attempted to do so, but departed from the standard tests of the HSM by using a self-
report method for message processing (Novak & Hoffman, 2005). As a result, 
while the attempt was made to test the theoretical linkages between the HSM and 




To reconcile these different results, and to test the connections between the 
HSM and inoculation theory, the present study tested both an standard inoculation  
message, and proposed that improvements could be made to the inoculation 
message to draw specific attention to how front groups shift responsibility, lack 
argument quality, and use misleading names referred to as RAN inoculation 
messages. Much research has demonstrated that individuals who are inoculated are 
motivated to protect their attitudes and as a result generate more counterarguments 
than controls (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau et al., 2007; Szabo & Pfau, 2002). The 
RAN message was designed to motivate careful and guided information seeking 
behaviors and the subsequent processing of the front group attack message in a way 
that would prepare them to easily identify deceptive front group tactics. As a result, 
it was expected that individuals in the standard inoculation condition would 
produce more counterarguments than those in the control group, but individuals in 
the RAN conditions would produce the most counterarguments.  
Similarly it was predicted that those in the RAN condition would accurately 
identify the source of the attack message as a front group more than those in the 
standard inoculation condition, who in turn would be more accurate than the 
control condition. Because research has demonstrated the efficacy of the 
inoculation strategy to confer resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion (Banas & 
Rains, 2010; Ivanov et al., 2012; Pfau et al., 2007; Szabo & Pfau, 2002) it was 
expected that the standard inoculation message would confer resistance to front 




the RAN inoculation more clearly articulated what features to look for in potential 
front group messages, they would be even more sensitive to both the argument 
quality and the sources of the attack messages and as a result more readily shield 
their attitudes from a front group’s counterattitudinal attack.  
RAN Inoculation Success  
As expected, systematic differences were found between the RAN 
inoculation group, the standard inoculation group, and the control group. 
Individuals in the RAN group engaged in a more focused on-line searches than did 
individuals in both the standard and control group. Furthermore, there was no 
difference between the search strategies between the standard inoculation group 
and the control group, which provides some evidence of the superiority of the RAN 
messages compared to the standard inoculation condition. When an individual goes 
to the library with no clear topic in mind, they may conduct quite a few searches 
before narrowing down to a single topic. However, with a clear purpose in mind, 
their searches are more precise and focused. Likewise the clear directives of the 
RAN messages may have narrowed the focus of the individuals so much so that 
only a few searches were necessary to gather the desired information.  
This research finding parallels the Walther et al. (2010) research about on-
line information seeking. In particular Walther and colleagues found that it didn’t 
matter when the searchers had a relational goal or not, their searching behaviors 
were the same. In addition, they found that it was only when the participants had 




and colleagues concluded the differences in searching behaviors were limited to 
liking and disliking. Both inoculation messages portrayed front groups in a 
negative light, but perhaps the specificity of the RAN messages reinforced this 
negativity in a way that produced the difference in searching behaviors. While the 
current research measured participants’ anger toward front group tactics, the results 
did not reveal significant differences between those in the RAN condition and 
those in the standard inoculation condition, although both groups experienced more 
anger than the control condition. Even if the participants in the RAN group did not 
report more anger about front groups tactics, they were still propelled to search 
more narrowly than did the standard and control conditions. Future research should 
include additional items to measure participant’s dislike or other motivational 
factors to explain the pattern of differences.   
Finally, only the individuals in the RAN inoculation condition reported 
more threat than the control condition. This finding is notable given the role of 
threat has recently been called into question by other inoculation researchers 
(Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Ivanov, 2012). This is an important finding not 
because it confirms threat’s role in inoculation, indeed neither those in standard nor 
those in the RAN condition were more resistant to counterattitudinal attacks than 
controls, but rather this result may lead researchers to determine the message 
related factors that present the boundary conditions of threat. More broadly 
however, as a number of resistance scholars have recently argued (Banas & Rains, 




threat in inoculation theory.  
It is worth noting again that both individuals in the RAN condition and the 
standard inoculation condition reported more anger about front groups’ attempts to 
deceive them than did those in the control condition. On the other hand, the RAN 
messages alone produced more threat than the control group, which remains the 
traditional explanation for the motivational force behind inoculation. It is important 
to determine what precisely about the RAN inoculation messages was sufficient to 
elicit threat. It is also important to determine if these message-related elements are 
applicable beyond the context of deceptive front group stealth messages. Was the 
RAN messages more successful at generating more focused on-line searching 
behaviors and threat because they were clearer? Was their success simply because 
they identified front groups’ common strategy of responsibility shifting or was the 
RAN message more successful because of the combination of identifying multiple 
front group strategies? These are important directions for future research. 
Unanticipated Inoculation Results  
As expected, those in an inoculation condition produced more 
counterarguing output than individuals in the control condition. Contrary to 
predictions, when just looking at the combined inoculation treatments compared to 
the control group, individuals did not report more threat nor did they report more 
resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion. This result may have occurred for three 
possible reasons. First, perhaps the attitude scale range was so narrow (1-7) as to 




starts out with an attitude score of 5.23 and drops to 5.14 at the end of the study 
these differences may be so small that it inhibits the discovery of real differences. 
Because resistance is dealing with how much each participant’s attitude changes 
after being exposed to the counterattitudinal attack, the change scores have the 
potential to be very small. One possible response to this challenge was presented in 
a newly published research study by Miller et al., (2013). Miller and colleagues 
employed the same semantic differential scales to measure attitudes, but instead of 
using a 7-point scale, they used an 11-point scale. Perhaps providing a wider 
continuum of possibilities may provide greater difference scores revealing any real 
differences between groups.  
A second possible explanation for these results is that compared to controls 
individuals in the inoculation conditions did not report more threat, which has 
traditionally been credited as the motivational variable behind resistance. Miller et 
al., (2013) called for a further exploration of threat’s function in inoculation as well 
ways to strengthen its motivation force. They successfully bolstered threat by 
integrating a psychological reactance induction designed to generate not only the 
traditional forewarning of impending attack but also a forewarning of a potential 
source would threaten their freedom to hold an attitude in the first place. Their 
results revealed that threat could be strengthened and those in the bolstered threat 
condition produced more resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion than those in 
the standard threat and control condition. Perhaps if the present research had 




The most likely possibility is that because all participants, even those in the 
control condition, had an opportunity to search the Internet for information about 
front groups everyone was resistant to front group stealth. In particular, during the 
10 minute information-seeking session, many searchers chose Wikipedia for 
information on front groups. Regardless of whether or not the information from the 
Wikipedia website was reliable or accurate, the descriptions were generally 
negative (Wikipedia, 2013). It may be that the information-seeking sessions 
provided the people in the control conditions with the information they needed to 
resist front group stealth messages. In order to determine if the information-seeking 
session contributed to resistance, this research would need to be replicated with the 
addition of a control condition that would receive the control message and would 
not have the information-seeking opportunity.  
The Trouble with Deception  
 Deception research consistently reports that individuals are not very skilled 
at detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008). In fact, much research 
demonstrates the accuracy rates are about 50 percent (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 
2008). Even so, research has demonstrated that training can improve accuracy rates 
(Frank & Feely, 2003). The present study found that individuals in the inoculation 
conditions made accurate classifications 83 percent of the time while those in the 
control condition made accurate classifications 69 percent of the time. Those in the 
inoculation conditions also reported more confidence in their classification of the 




colleagues (2003) advance that successful deception detection training should 
include “instruction, practice, and feedback” (p. 359). Perhaps the inoculation 
treatments served as an instructional tool and the couterarguments gave the 
participants an opportunity to practice. If so, all that was missing was feedback.  
Feedback might have prevented a potential negative side effect of the 
inoculation treatments. In particular, this research explored whether exposure to the 
inoculation messages would influence their accuracy in properly classifying other 
groups as front groups. The results reveal no differences in accuracy between those 
in the inoculation condition and the control condition for the Sierra Club and the 
Family Research Council. In particular individuals in the inoculation condition 
accurately classified the Sierra Club 64 percent of the time and those in the 
inoculation condition accurately classified the group 58 percent of the time. 
Furthermore, individuals in the inoculation condition accurately classified the 
Family Research Council 59 percent of the time and those in the control condition 
were accurate 58 percent of the time. While the percent of people in the inoculation 
conditions classifying these groups as non-front groups was higher, it was not 
significantly higher. These results are notable and somewhat concerning because 
both of these groups are legitimate organizations. It may be that the inoculation 
message contributes to a lie bias, which in this case resulted in the inaccurate 
classification of legitimate groups as front-groups.  
Systematic differences were found between individuals in the inoculation 




Center for Consumer Freedom, which is a front group. Individuals in the 
inoculation condition accurately classified the Center for Consumer Freedom as a 
front group 69 percent of the time and individuals in the control condition 
accurately classified the group only 54 percent of the time. Again, the fact that 
individuals in the inoculation condition were more accurate when the message 
sources were front groups but not when they were legitimate groups may provide 
additional evidence of the unwarranted suspicion. Perhaps feedback would have 
prevented what appears to be an elevated suspicion among those in the inoculation 
conditions. As a result, further research should determine if these accuracies could 
be attributed to a lie bias rather than because the group really was a front group.  
Those in the inoculation condition more accurately classified front groups; 
however the results revealed that they were not more confident that their 
classifications were correct. In particular, those in the inoculation condition had no 
more confidence than those in the control group that they accurately classified the 
Family Research Council, the Sierra Club, or the Center for Consumer freedom as a 
front group or not. It appears that even when the individuals in the inoculation 
condition were more accurate in classifying the Center for Consumer Freedom as a 
front group than those in the control condition, they showed no more confidence in 
the accuracy of their assessments than those in the control condition. It appears that 
confidence in their assessments may be limited to circumstances when they have 




Theoretical Implications for Inoculation  
 Threat is central to traditional theorizing about resistance to 
counterattitudinal behavior within inoculation research. However, the Banas and 
Rains (2010) meta-analytic review revealed that threat was not significantly related 
to resistance. This finding is important because it invites careful exploration of the 
motivational factor that was once considered the heart of the inoculation strategy. 
This investigation found that compared to controls, threat was only significant in 
the RAN condition. Traditionally speaking, since the RAN messages produced 
more threat and counterarguing than the control group, they should have also been 
more resistant to front group stealth messages. However, this outcome was not the 
case. No differences were found in the level of resistance to counterattitudinal 
persuasion between groups.  
A budding focus among inoculation scholars concerns how people will 
interact with others after exposure to inoculation messages. In particular, Compton 
and Pfau (2009) theorized that individuals who experience the threat and 
counterarguing combination within inoculation treatments could spread the 
immunizing effect of inoculation because they would engage in “proselytizing” 
within their social circles (p. 9).  Ivanov, Miller, Compton, Averbeck, Harrison, 
Sims, et al. (2012) explored this concept by investigating whether postinoculation 
talk or discussing the issues addressed in the treatment with others had any 
influence on subsequent resistance. They predicted that inoculation treatments 




resistance to subsequent counterattitudinal attacks. They found that individuals in 
the inoculation condition discussed the issues more and also with more 
conversational partners than those in the control conditions. Furthermore, they 
discovered that postinoculation talk or discussing the issues presented in the 
inoculation treatments with others outside of the experimental setting bolsters 
resistance. This finding lead Ivanov and colleagues to conclude “Each newly 
discovered ancillary effect of the inoculation process offers a more complete 
portrait of the inoculation-generated resistance to influence” (p. 712-713).  These 
results may point to an individual’s desire for interaction or a simple desire for 
additional information, or perhaps even both.  
The results of the current investigation certainly point to systematically 
different information-seeking behaviors among those in the RAN condition. It is 
clear that both individuals in the RAN and the standard inoculation evaluated the 
character of front groups significantly less than the control condition. But what is 
unclear is why that lower rating of character did not motivate the participants 
equally to search for information about front groups. Perhaps the RAN message 
was more engaging to the readers and therefore they more actively searched for 
information about front groups. Perhaps those in the standard conditions made up 
their mind quickly that front groups had poor character but had no further 
motivation to seek and carefully process related information. Future research 
should explore if the RAN treatment also produced more postinoculation talk and 




different information-seeking behaviors. 
Theoretical Implications for HSM 
 This study explored the linkages between the HSM and inoculation theory. 
It was anticipated that when individuals’ desire for confidence in their ability to 
identify deceptive front group messages was greater than their actual confidence to 
do so, they would be more motivated to engage in systematic processing of both the 
inoculation treatments and the counterattitudinal attack. This hypothesis was 
grounded in the HSM’s sufficiency principle, which states that individuals’ who’s 
desired confidence is greater than their actual confidence will be more motivated to 
systematically process information (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). 
However, neither the sufficiency principle nor accuracy motivation predicted 
relevant on-line information seeking behaviors. These results leave unanswered 
questions about the systematic differences between the searches conducted by 
individuals in the RAN condition, compared to the standard inoculation condition 
and the control condition.  
Grounded in the HSM, this investigation predicted those in the RAN 
condition would evaluate front groups as the least credible, followed by those in the 
standard inoculation condition. Participants rated front group expertise, character, 
and caring, all components of credibility. Both inoculation conditions rated the 
front groups as less caring than controls, those in the RAN condition did not rate 
front groups to be less caring than those in the standard condition. There were no 




expertise. Only individuals in the standard inoculation condition rated front group 
character significantly lower than the control condition. Even so, this evaluation did 
not lead to resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion.  
The HSM predicts that when the sufficiency principle is met, individuals 
process messages systematically. If the sufficiency principle is not met, individuals 
will process messages heuristically. This study found no systematic differences for 
individuals in the RAN, standard inoculation, or control condition. While there are 
things about the inoculation messages that should produce systematic differences 
with regard to resistance, it could be that many of individuals even in the control 
condition became curious as they began to read the information on-line. Because 
message processing was measured after the on-line search, it may be that 
individuals were able to clearly note concrete information and evaluations of front 
groups. It could be that the threat measure inside the survey piqued the participant’s 
curiosity and as a result, when they were given the opportunity to search, many 
searched for information about front groups. Again, this would also provide the 
explanation for why there were no differences between the groups on resistance.  
These results follow the pattern discovered by Banas and Rains (2010) as 
they discovered no relationship between issue involvement and resistance. While 
this investigation explored accuracy motivation rather than issue involvement, the 
results were similar for these two motivational variables. Still, it is likely that 
motivation is a central part of this process and as a result, future research needs to 




made heuristics even easier to use as they were more available, accessible, and 
applicable, three predictors of the application of heuristic cues (Chaiken et al., 
1989). This possibility should be tested in future research.  
Limitations 
 Inoculation scholars are pushing toward a better understanding of how to 
maximize resistance. This investigation proposed that fine-tuning the way a 
motivational booster was delivered to participants could bolster the efficacy of the 
inoculation treatment. While this is an important line of inquiry, the present study 
did not demonstrate that the inclusion of a booster strengthened resistance. It may 
be that those who read the booster message designed to be motivational did not find 
the message motivational, but rather simply informational. Also, everyone in Phase 
II was told to carefully process the information from the study, which may have 
had a lasting influence on participants’ motivation to carefully review the 
information. Furthermore, while an attempt was made to determine if inoculation 
was an effective strategy to confer resistance to front group stealth regardless of 
what side of the issues of mandatory recycling legislation or preservation of the 
National Wetlands a person might be on, the results can only be generalizable to 
individuals who have positive attitudes toward both issues.  
In addition, in an attempt to test the efficacy of inoculation on both sides of 
these issues, artificial front groups were created. Unfortunately, because the 
participants had 10 minutes to search for additional information about the front 




legitimate when their search stings returned no matches. In fact, one participant 
repeatedly typed search strings looking for information about Conservatives for 
Clean Communities, but of course no match was available. Therefore these results 
may not be generalizable to negative attitudes toward issues. Finally, preliminarily 
the control condition was presented in a single survey in which participants were 
asked to generate counterarguments to both issues. This issue was corrected before 
the majority of participants were enrolled in the control condition, but may have 
influenced the number of counterarguments generated in the control condition just 
because of fatigue.  
Directions for Future Research  
 Future research should explore information-seeking behaviors such as on-
line searches in this study as well as post inoculation talk (PIT) (Ivanov, et al., 
2012) to better understand the potential spread of resistance. While this study was 
confined to examining information-seeking behaviors, it would important to 
determine if focused information-seeking behaviors together with PIT generate an 
even stronger level of resistance to counterattitudinal persuasion. 
 While threat has traditionally received the credit for the motivation to 
protect attitudes, even those in the RAN condition, the only group to experience 
more threat than the control condition were not more resistant to counterattitudinal 
threat.  These results do not rule out the role of threat in the inoculation process, but 
do call for further exploration of its function. It may be that it is necessary but not 




motivational variables beyond threat such as psychological reactance posted by 
Miller et al., (2013) the potential force behind resistance to counterattitudinal 
attacks. It may be fruitful to replicate the experiment conducted by Miller and 
colleagues with the addition of a condition that dropped the traditional threat 
induction and only had the reactance induction. These are important directions for 
future research.  
  One unexpected finding was that there were no systematic differences in 
message processing between the inoculation or control groups. It was expected that 
the RAN condition in particular would generate the most systematic processing. It 
may be that the inoculation messages made heuristics even easier to use as they 
were more available, accessible, and applicable, three predictors of the application 
of heuristic cues (Chaiken et al., 1989). The possibility that the inoculation 
conditions equipped the participants with easily readily available, accessible, and 
applicable heuristics should be tested in future research.  
Conclusion  
This research explored two motivational factors accuracy motivation and 
the sufficiency principle drawn from the heuristic processing model (Chaiken, 
1980) to understand the role of message processing in the success of deceptive 
front groups. To date, Pfau and colleagues (2007) suggested front groups are 
successful because individuals fail to systematically process their messages but did 
not test this explanation. Robertson et al., (2010) attempted to test this explanation; 




Pfau et al. (2007) predicted and found that inoculation produced resistance to front 
group attacks; however Robertson et al (2010) did not. In an attempt to reconcile 
these differences, this investigation tested inoculation theory again, but this time 
with a few changes based on front group strategies. In particular, front groups 
constantly hide behind deceptive positive sounding names. Because Pfau and 
colleagues found that inoculation conferred resistance to front group messages but 
Robertson and colleagues did not, this research explored whether a standard 
inoculation message is sufficient to generate resistance to front groups’ messages or 
if an improved inoculation treatment called RAN inoculation is necessary.  
This study reasoned that if the RAN inoculation messages were superior, 
they should also generate more relevant and focused information-seeking behaviors 
and greater accuracy in classifying front groups. While this research failed to shed 
light on the link between message processing and the persuasiveness of front group 
messages, it did establish the efficacy of the RAN inoculation treatment for both 
the production of counterarguments but also those individuals engaged in more 
focused information-seeking behaviors. Individuals in the inoculation conditions 
were also more likely to accurately identify the source of the messages as front 
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Appendix A: Inoculation Messages 
Keep America Beautiful RAN 
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues. 
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 
corporations and special interest groups choose less honorable tactics. Many 
organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 
that discourage listeners from scrutinizing the real goals of the group. Research 
confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
Keep America Beautiful (KAB), is one such front group. Most people 
would think KAB was an organization that represents their values. In reality, KAB, 
funded largely by tobacco companies, launched campaigns around the country 




derailing any regulations that would force corporations to make environmentally 
friendly products and packaging. Clearly, we need to do our part, however 
corporations should also do their part creating more environmentally friendly 
products and packaging. KAB arguments are so compelling that without careful 
scrutiny of their message, they can win over people just like you, therefore their 
messages have an enormous impact on public opinion about cigarette and other 
litter control and removal. Their message sounds positive, but it leaves you on the 
hook to pay for and to clean up the environment, while tobacco companies do 
nothing.  
Front groups deceive many people but if you understand their tactics, you 
can avoid being deceived. Here is a list of front group tactics.  
1. Front groups try to excuse corporations from their responsibility to 
make safe products. They do this by emphasizing that individuals, not 
corporations should assume responsibility for the negative effects of their 
products.  
2. Front groups select names that sound positive, but are misleading. It 
is easy to assume that a group with the name “Keep America Beautiful,” 
would pursue all options to keep communities beautiful. However, they should 





3. Front groups use arguments that sound good, but are vague and 
often unclear. Sometimes statements are misleading because of what they omit 
who exactly funds them.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group like Keep American 
Beautiful. If so, go on-line to find out what you can about the group and its 
sponsor. Evaluate the merits of the position in the message and the name of the 
group. You may find that the sponsor’s name and the arguments are at cross-





Keep America Beautiful Standard 
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues.  
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 
corporations and special interest groups choose less honorable tactics. Many 
organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 
that discourage listeners from scrutinizing the real goals of the group. Research 
confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
Keep America Beautiful (KAB), is one such front group. Most people 
would think KAB was an organization that represents their values. In reality, KAB, 
funded largely by tobacco companies, launched campaigns around the country 
promoting individual responsibility for litter removal while simultaneously de-




friendly products and packaging. Clearly, we need to do our part, however 
corporations should also do their part creating more environmentally friendly 
products and packaging. KAB arguments are so compelling that without careful 
scrutiny of their message, they can win over people just like you, therefore their 
messages have an enormous impact on public opinion about cigarette and other 
litter control and removal. Their message sounds positive, but it leaves you on the 
hook to pay for and to clean up the environment, while tobacco companies do 
nothing.  
The likelihood of your contact with front group like KAB is fairly high, but 
you can protect yourself from the deception.  
1. Pay attention to the real sponsor of these campaigns. Don’t be fooled 
by the name. The real power behind these campaigns is that the name may be 
designed to deceive you.  
2. We encourage you to find out about the sponsor and their true values 
by going on line.  
3. Focus on their arguments. Are the claims true and well supported, or 
are they vague and/or misleading? Be sure that you evaluate the merits of the 
position in the message.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group. If so, evaluate the merits of 
the position in the message and the name of the group. You may find that the 





National Wetlands Coalition RAN 
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues.  
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 
corporations and special interest groups choose less honorable tactics. Many 
organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 
that discourage listeners from scrutinizing the real goals of the group. Research 
confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
The National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) is one such group. Most people 
with pro-environmental attitudes would think the NWC represents their values. In 
reality, the NWC, funded largely by oil and gas companies launched campaigns to 
erode legislative attempts to shield Federally protected wetlands because they 




restrictions for business in nationally protected wetlands habitats. In order to 
address environmental sustainability, we all need to do our part. Legislation is 
needed to ensure that development firms and oil and gas companies do their part by 
adopting more environmentally sustainable practices because as we can see, they 
won’t adopt these practices on their own. The NWC’s arguments are so crafty that 
they can deceive people just like you. Their messages potentially have an enormous 
impact on public opinion about environmentally sustainable business practices.  
Front groups deceive many people but if you understand their tactics, you 
can avoid being deceived. Here is a list of front group tactics.  
1. Front groups try to excuse corporations from their responsibility to 
make safe products. They do this by emphasizing that individuals, not 
corporations should assume responsibility for the negative effects of their 
products.  
2. Front groups select names that sound positive, but are misleading. It 
is easy to assume that a group with the name “National Wetlands Coalition,” 
would pursue all options to keep communities beautiful. However, they should 
be called “National Drill and Develop the Wetlands Coalition.”  
3. Front groups use arguments that sound good, but are vague and 
often unclear. Sometimes statements are misleading because of what they omit 
who exactly funds them.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group like the National Wetlands 




sponsor. Evaluate the merits of the position in the message and the name of the 
group. You may find that the sponsor’s name and the arguments are at cross-





National Wetlands Coalition Standard:  
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues. 
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 
corporations and special interest groups choose less honorable tactics. Many 
organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 
that discourage listeners from scrutinizing the real goals of the group. Research 
confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
The National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) is one such group. Most people 
with pro-environmental attitudes would think the NWC represents their values. In 
reality, the NWC, funded largely by oil and gas companies launched campaigns to 
erode legislative attempts to shield Federally protected wetlands because they 




restrictions for business in nationally protected wetlands habitats. In order to 
address environmental sustainability, we all need to do our part. Legislation is 
needed to ensure that development firms and oil and gas companies do their part by 
adopting more environmentally sustainable practices because as we can see, they 
won’t adopt these practices on their own. The NWC’s arguments are so crafty that 
they can deceive people just like you. Their messages potentially have an enormous 
impact on public opinion about environmentally sustainable business practices.  
The likelihood of your contact with front group like NWC is fairly high but 
you can protect yourself from the deception.  
1. You can pay close attention to the real sponsor of these campaigns. 
Don’t be fooled by the name. The real power behind these campaigns is the 
name may be designed to deceive you.  
2. We encourage you not to find out about the sponsor and their true 
values by going on line.  
3. Focus on the claims or arguments presented. Are the claims true and 
well supported, or are they vague and/or misleading? Be sure that you 
evaluate the merits of the position in the message.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group like the National Wetlands 
Coalition. If so, go on-line to find out what you can about the group and its 
sponsor. Evaluate the merits of the position in the message and the name of the 
group. You may find that the sponsor’s name and the arguments are at cross-




Control Message  
Speech Anxiety Worse for Some, but Most Can Overcome It 
WebMD Medical News 
April 20, 2006 -- Fear of public speaking strikes some people harder -- and 
differently -- than others. A study shows that people who suffer most over speaking 
in public get more anxious as their presentation gets under way. When it's over, 
instead of feeling relief, they feel anxious. If public speaking scares you, you aren't 
alone, says Paul Witt, PhD, assistant professor of communication at Texas 
Christian University. "It is even scarier than rattlesnakes," Witt tells WebMD. "The 
idea of making a presentation in public is the No. 1 fear of people in the U.S." 
Witt and colleagues studied 48 male and 48 female students enrolled in a 
beginning public speaking class. The speakers underwent several tests before and 
after making a five-minute assigned presentation. The tests included a self-report 
inventory of gastrointestinal symptoms. To nobody's surprise, people who are 
anxious by nature -- what psychologists call high-trait anxiety -- had the most 
symptoms when speaking in public. What was surprising was the anxiety pattern. 
People with low-trait anxiety get nervous before speaking but begin to relax once 
they get started. People with high-trait anxiety, however, are anxious when they 
start speaking and get more anxious as they go on." We hear this comment a lot 
from speakers: 'I was so nervous when I started but by the time I finished it wasn't 
so bad. I even wished I had more time,'" Witt says. "What happens is we have 




You cannot change your traits. If you are a person with high-trait anxiety, 
there's no simple way to become a low-trait-anxiety person. The good news is that 
we can learn to win with the cards we are dealt. High-trait anxiety is a challenge 
but need not be a disability. Witt doesn't try to motivate people. Instead, he teaches 
public speaking skills. 
Before speaking: Picture yourself in the classroom or in the meeting room, 
standing up, taking your notes to the lectern, and so on. 
1. Practice going through your presentation multiple times. Practice 
with someone who is supportive, so you learn to succeed rather than to fail. 
Sensitizers focus on the little things. 
2. “Through visualization get all that negative stuff out, so when the 
real day comes, you can focus on real issues." Witt says. 
3. During your speech, deal with symptoms as they occur: Dry mouth? 
Hands trembling? Put them together. Voice quivering? "Pause, take a deep 
breath or two, and smile. It is amazing what a smile will do," Witt say. 
Sweating? "Forget it, nobody sees that anyway," Witt says. "Those symptoms 
that distract us are treatable," Witt says. 
"It doesn't take a PhD to figure this out, but so many people don't -- because 
as sensitizers, they become so focused on their symptoms and their embarrassment 





Appendix B: Attack Messages 
Keep America Beautiful 
Keep America Beautiful® Kicks Off National Great American Cleanup™ 
STAMFORD, Conn. - Keep America Beautiful Great American Cleanup 
mobilizes millions of volunteers each spring to clean, beautify and improve their 
communities - will kickoff nationally at the Times Square Visitors Center with the 
City of New York being honored for improving the quality of life of New Yorkers.  
The Great American Cleanup, the nation's largest annual community based 
improvement program, is Keep America Beautiful's signature event. More than 2.3 
million people will be volunteering 7 million hours to improve more than 15,000 
communities during 30,000 events. Volunteers can take part in planned local 
activities or start their own activities.  
"The 20th anniversary of our Great American Cleanup marks a milestone 
for creating and maintaining clean communities as volunteers rally together to 
eliminate litter, graffiti and blight that plague local environments. By showing their 
commitment through hands-on activities, volunteers provide individual solutions to 
sustaining a healthy quality of life for everyone," said G. Raymond Stanley, 
president of Keep America Beautiful. The organization stresses individual 
responsibility rather than corporate responsibility for proper disposal and clean-up 
efforts. “Let’s stop blaming businesses and start taking personal responsibility to 




KAB's stated mission is to "empower individuals to take greater 
responsibility for enhancing their local community environment." KAB believes 
that if individuals take responsibility for disposing their wrappers, packaging, and 
garbage, the need for restrictive regulations on business will be reduced.  
The Keep American Beautiful organization believes individuals are 
responsible for improving their community environments, eliminating the need for 
burdensome and intrusive government intervention and restrictive policies on 
business to change their products and packaging. Our Guiding principles include 
promoting individual responsibility, environmental education, community 
partnerships (government, business, civic), and promoting volunteerism. 
Keep American Beautiful provides sustainable solutions to improve 
physical and visual aspects of community environments so individuals can directly 





National Wetlands Coalition  
National Wetlands Coalition– Preserving the Nations Wetland 
Burlington, Massachusetts, - The National Wetlands Coalition (“Coalition”) 
lead by Chairman Leighton Steward, is a diverse group of private and public sector 
entities who joined together to advocate balanced federal policy for conserving and 
regulating the Nation’s wetlands. Members of the Coalition own or manage 
wetlands and other “waters of the United States” that are subject to strict 
burdensome and unnecessary federal jurisdiction.  
The mission of The Coalition is to work with the Congress for legislative 
reform of and to provide more work permits in federal wetlands. In past 
Congresses, the Coalition was instrumental in the development and support of the 
Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act and the Clean Water 
Act Amendments of 1995.  
The Coalition believes in several key elements for a reasonable national 
wetlands program. For example, The Coalition supports the national goal of “no net 
loss” of wetlands measured in terms of the functions and value of wetlands. As 
long as the same amount of wetlands area is preserved developers should not be 
subject to such constricting regulations.  
The Coalition supports the establishment of tax incentives to encourage the 
donation of wetlands for conservation. If people are willing to donate parts of their 
land to conservation, businesses should be aloud to develop on other wetlands 




economic growth. In order to successfully restore and protect the nation’s valuable 
wetlands, economic incentives should be used to stimulate and reward private 
sector action rather than always placing the burden on businesses.  
Landowners, concerned citizens and the National Wetlands Coalition agree 
that wetlands are critical to preserving habitats and ecosystems and must be 
protected. However, the federal government, while seeking to protect wetlands, 
imposes burdensome and ineffective regulations on private property and these 





Appendix C: Motivational Booster 
 Many people make decisions based on incomplete or even deceptive 
information.  As a result, many people make poor decisions.  Poor decisions lead 
consumers to purchase products or citizens to support regulations that are useless or 
dangerous.  Other times it leads them to elect politicians they think will represent 
them, but who don’t actually support their views on the issues.  You don’t have to 
make poor decisions and in fact, good decision-making is a quality many 
employers are looking for.  One of the best ways to avoid making errors is to think 
carefully about the information that you read.  At the end of your participation in 
the study today, the researcher will personally ask you about the types of 






Appendix D: Wetlands Protection Survey 
Phase One 
Please print your first and last name:  
_________________________________________ 
Please type in the name of course instructor and course number you would like to 
receive credit for: 
______________________ ________________________ 
Please type in your email address so that we can remind you to participate in Phase 
II and Phase III of the study. 
______________________________________________ 
Please circle one:  Male (1)  Female (2) 
Age:  _________ 
Year in school (Please circle one): Freshmen (1) Sophomore (2) Junior (3) Senior 
(4) 
Attitude Measures 
Here are several statements about three issues.  For each statement, please circle the 
number that best expresses your level of agreement with the statement.   
What is your overall attitude toward creating mandatory recycling legislation? 
 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Positive 
Bad   1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Good 




Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right 
Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable 
Involvement Measures 
How important is the issue of creating mandatory recycling legislation? 
Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Important 
Of no concern  1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Of much concern 
Means nothing  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Matters to me 
Insignificant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
Irrelevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Attitude Measures  
What is your overall attitude about preserving the National Wetlands (preserving 
the habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions? 
Negative  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Positive 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
Foolish  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right  
Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable 
Involvement Measures 
How important is the issue of preserving the National Wetlands (preserving the 




Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Important 
Of no concern  1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Of much concern 
Means nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Matters to me 
Insignificant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
Irrelevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Phase Two 
Please read the following message before proceeding to the next session.   
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues.  
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 
corporations and special interest groups choose less honorable tactics. Many 
organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 




confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
The National Wetlands Coalition (NWC) is one such group. Most people 
with pro-environmental attitudes would think the NWC represents their values. In 
reality, the NWC, funded largely by oil and gas companies launched campaigns to 
erode legislative attempts to shield Federally protected wetlands because they 
slowed corporate profits. Despite their name, NWC’s purpose is to prevent 
restrictions for business in nationally protected wetlands habitats. In order to 
address environmental sustainability, we all need to do our part. Legislation is 
needed to ensure that development firms and oil and gas companies do their part by 
adopting more environmentally sustainable practices because as we can see, they 
won’t adopt these practices on their own. The NWC’s arguments are so crafty that 
they can deceive people just like you. Their messages potentially have an enormous 
impact on public opinion about environmentally sustainable business practices. 
Front groups deceive many people but if you understand their tactics, you can 
avoid being deceived. Here is a list of front group tactics.  
1. Front groups try to excuse corporations from their responsibility to 
make safe products. They do this by emphasizing that individuals, not 
corporations should assume responsibility for the negative effects of their 
products.  
2. Front groups select names that sound positive, but are misleading. It 




would pursue all options to keep communities beautiful. However, they should 
be called “National Drill and Develop the Wetlands Coalition.”  
3. Front groups use arguments that sound good, but are vague and 
often unclear. Sometimes statements are misleading because of what they omit 
who exactly funds them.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group like the National Wetlands 
Coalition. If so, go on-line to find out what you can about the group and its 
sponsor. Evaluate the merits of the position in the message and the name of the 
group. You may find that the sponsor’s name and the arguments are at cross-
purposes with one another. 
Message Recall  
Please take as much time as you need to identify all the information you can about 
the message they just read.   
Threat Measures 
The next section is designed to help us understand how you feel about the idea that 
DESPITE YOUR OPINION about the benefits of preserving the National Wetlands 
(preserving the habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions), THERE IS 
THE POSSIBILITY YOU MAY COME IN TO CONTACT WITH ARGUMENTS 
CONTRARY TO YOUR POSITION THAT ARE SO PERSUASIVE THAT 
THEY MAY CAUSE YOU TO RETIHINK YOUR POSITION.  I find THIS 
POSSIBILITY to be:  




2.  Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Threatening 
3.  Calm  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anxious 
4.  Not scary  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Scary 
5.  Not harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
6.  Not risky  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risky 
Anger Measure  
This section is designed to help us understand how you feel about the idea that 
DESPITE YOUR OPINION about the benefits of preserving the National Wetlands 
(preserving the habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions), THERE IS 
THE POSSIBILITY YOU MAY be targeted by a font-group dedicated to deceiving 
you into RETIHINKING YOUR POSITION. 
1.  I feel angry that a front group will try to deceive me. 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree 
2.  I feel irritated that a front group will try to deceive me. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree 
3.  I feel annoyed that a front group will try to deceive me. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7   Strongly agree 
4.  I feel aggravated that a front group will try to deceive me.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7   Strongly agree 
Counterarguing Measures 
Think about the issue of (environmental conservation like) limiting national 




challenge your position about environmental conservation.  Write down arguments 
you would make in response to the challenges you just listed.  Now that you have 
written down arguments on both sides of this issue, please rate the quality of each 
argument on a scale of 1 (meaning a very poor quality argument) and a 7 (meaning 
a very strong argument).  
Cognitive Response Measures 
You will now have three minutes to write down all your thoughts about front 
groups and front group tactics. (The responses will be coded for relevance and 
categorized as attribute related or as source related).   
Sufficiency Principle Measures 
Please indicate how confident you are in your ability to identify front group stealth 
messages if you encountered them. 
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Very confident  
Please indicate how confident you would like to be in your ability identify front 
groups stealth messages if you encounter them.   
Not at all confident  1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Very confident  
Phase Three 
Accuracy Motivational Booster  
 
Many people make decisions based on incomplete or even deceptive 
information.  As a result, many people make poor decisions.  Poor decisions lead 
consumers to purchase products or citizens to support regulations that are useless or 




them, but who don’t actually support their views on the issues.  You don’t have to 
make poor decisions and in fact, good decision-making is a quality many 
employers are looking for.  One of the best ways to avoid making errors is to think 
carefully about the information that you read.  At the end of your participation in 
the study today, the researcher will personally ask you about the types of 
information you used to draw the correct conclusion about the information. (129) 
Sufficiency Principle Measures 
Please indicate how confident you are in your ability to identify front group stealth 
messages if you encountered them. 
Not at all confident  1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Very confident   
Please indicate how confident you would like to be in your ability identify front 
groups stealth messages if you encounter them.   
Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Very confident  
Accuracy Motivation 
Please indicate to what extent it is important to you to accurately identify a front 
group. 
Not at all important  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Very Important  
Please indicate to what extent is it relevant to you to know if a message you hear or 
read is from a front group. 





Please indicate to what extent does it matter to you that you are able to identify 
front groups when you encounter them?  
Does not matter    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Matters a lot  
Attack Messages: National Wetlands Coalition National Wetlands Coalition – 
Preserving the Nations Wetland  
Burlington, Massachusetts, - The National Wetlands Coalition (“Coalition”) 
lead by Chairman Leighton Steward, is a diverse group of private and public sector 
entities who joined together to advocate balanced federal policy for conserving and 
regulating the Nation’s wetlands. Members of the Coalition own or manage 
wetlands and other “waters of the United States” that are subject to strict 
burdensome and unnecessary federal jurisdiction.  
The mission of The Coalition is to work with the Congress for legislative 
reform of and to provide more work permits in federal wetlands. In past 
Congresses, the Coalition was instrumental in the development and support of the 
Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act and the Clean Water 
Act Amendments of 1995.  
The Coalition believes in several key elements for a reasonable national 
wetlands program. For example, The Coalition supports the national goal of “no net 
loss” of wetlands measured in terms of the functions and value of wetlands. As 
long as the same amount of wetlands area is preserved developers should not be 




The Coalition supports the establishment of tax incentives to encourage the 
donation of wetlands for conservation. If people are willing to donate parts of their 
land to conservation, businesses should be aloud to develop on other wetlands 
areas. But as usual the government just doesn’t understand how to promote 
economic growth. In order to successfully restore and protect the nation’s valuable 
wetlands, economic incentives should be used to stimulate and reward private 
sector action rather than always placing the burden on businesses.  
Landowners, concerned citizens and the National Wetlands Coalition agree 
that wetlands are critical to preserving habitats and ecosystems and must be 
protected. However, the federal government, while seeking to protect wetlands, 
imposes burdensome and ineffective regulations on private property and these 
tough and restrictive regulations should be eased to promote growth.  
Attitude and Involvement Reassessment 
What is your overall attitude about preserving the National Wetlands (preserving 
the habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions? 
Negative  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
Foolish  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right  






How important is the issue of preserving the National Wetlands (preserving the 
habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions? 
Unimportant     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Important 
Of no concern     1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Of much concern 
Means nothing    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Matters to me 
Insignificant     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
Irrelevant      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Anger Measures  
Here are several statements about National Wetlands Coalition.  For each 
statement, please circle the number that best expresses your level of agreement with 
the statement.   
4.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by National Wetlands 
Coalition, I feel angry because I believe they are trying to deceive me.   
Strongly disagree   1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree 
5.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by National Wetlands 
Coalition, I feel irritated because I believe they are trying to deceive me.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree 
6.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by National Wetlands 
Coalition, I feel annoyed because I believe they are trying to deceive me. 




7.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by National Wetlands 
Coalition, I feel aggravated because I believe they are trying to deceive me. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7Strongly agree 
Front Group Source Credibility Measures 
 
Here are several statements about National Wetlands Coalition.  For each 
statement, please circle the number that best expresses your level of agreement with 
the statement.   
National Wetlands Coalition is 
Reliable          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unreliable 
Uniformed      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     informed 
Unqualified    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     qualified 
Intelligent       1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unintelligent 
Valuable         1     2     3     4     5     6     7     worthless 
Inexpert           1     2     3     4     5     6     7     expert 
Dishonest        1     2     3     4     5     6     7     honest 
Unfriendly      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     friendly 
Pleasant          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unpleasant  
Selfish            1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unselfish  
Awful             1     2     3     4     5     6     7     nice 
Virtuous          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     sinful 
Cares about me      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Doesn’t care about me 
Has my interest at heart      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     doesn’t have my interests at heart 
Focused only on themselves and the companies they serve       
1     2     3     4     5     6     7      




Unconcerned with me       1     2     3     4     5     6     7     concerned with me 
Insensitive                         1     2     3     4     5     6     7     sensitive  
Empathetic                        1     2     3     4     5     6     7     apathetic  
Understanding                   1     2     3     4     5     6     7     not understanding  
Unresponsive                    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     responsive  
Understands how I feel     1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Doesn’t understand how I feel 
Doesn’t understand how I think      1     2     3     4     5     6     7      understand how I think  
Cognitive Response Measures 
You will now have three minutes to write down all your thoughts about the 
message you just read. (The responses will be coded for relevance and categorized 
as attribute related or as source related).   
Accuracy in Front Group Identification 
22.  Is the National Wetlands Coalition a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 
How confident are you that you made the correct judgment about the NWC is a 
front group? 
Not at all confident   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Completely confident  
If you answered No, please continue to question _____ 
You have indicated that the National Wetlands Coalition is a front group.  Please 





Now that you have highlighted portions of the NWC message, please explain why 
you believe the highlighted portion of the message provides a clue that the NWC is 
a front group.  
Perceived Deceptiveness Measures  
Please evaluate the truthfulness of the message presented by the National Wetlands 
Coalition.   
Completely Deceptive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7        Completely Truthful  
Unintended Inoculation Effects: Grassroots or Astroturf Measures 
In this section you will be asked to determine whether the groups below are 
comprised of grassroots organizations or front groups.   
Family Research Council 
Since 1983, Family Research Council (FRC) has advanced faith, family and 
freedom in public policy and public opinion.  FRC's team of seasoned experts 
promotes these core values through policy research, public education on Capitol 
Hill and in the media, and grassroots mobilization.  We review legislation, meet 
with policymakers, publish books and pamphlets, build coalitions, testify before 
Congress, and maintain a powerful presence in print and broadcast media.  Through 
our outreach to pastors, we equip churches to transform the culture. 
26.  Is the Family Research Council a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 





28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Family 
Research Council is a front group or why you determined that it was not a front 
group.  
The Sierra Club 
Since 1892, the Sierra Club has been working to protect communities, wild 
places, and the planet itself.  We are the largest and most influential grassroots 
environmental organization in the United States.  And our founder, John Muir, 
appears on the back of the California quarter. 
26.  Is the Sierra Club a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 
27.  How confident are you that you that the Sierra Club is a front group? 
28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Sierra Club is 
a front group or why you determined that it was not a front group.  
Center for Consumer Freedom 
Founded in 1996, the Center for Consumer Freedom is a nonprofit 
organization devoted to promoting personal responsibility and protecting 
consumer choices.  We believe that the consumer is King.  And Queen.  A 
growing cabal of activists has meddled in Americans’ lives in recent years.  
They include self-anointed "food police," health campaigners, trial lawyers, 
personal-finance do-gooders, animal-rights misanthropes, and meddling 
bureaucrats.  Their common denominator? They all claim to know "what's best 




what we want, eat what we want, drink what we want, and raise our children as 
we see fit.  When they push ordinary Americans around, we're here to push 
back. 
26.  Is the Center for Consumer Freedom a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______  
27.  How confident are you that you that the Center for Consumer Freedom is a 
front group? 
28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Center for 






Appendix E: Recycling Legislation Survey 
Phase One 
Please print your first and last name:  
_________________________________________ 
Please type in the name of course instructor and course number you would like to 
receive credit for: 
______________________ ________________________ 
Please type in the email address that you would like us to contact you to remind 
you to complete Phase II and Phase III of the study.   
______________________________________________ 
Please circle one:  Male (1)  Female (2) 
Age:  _________ 
Year in school (Please circle one): Freshmen (1) Sophomore (2) Junior (3) Senior 
(4) 
Attitude Measures 
Here are several statements about two issues.  For each statement, please circle the 
number that best expresses your level of agreement with the statement.   
What is your overall attitude toward creating mandatory recycling legislation for 
corporations? 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Positive 
Bad   1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Good 




Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right 
Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7        Favorable 
Involvement Measures 
How important is the issue of creating mandatory recycling legislation for 
corporations? 
Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Important 
Of no concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Of much concern 
Means nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Matters to me 
Insignificant   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
Irrelevant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Attitude Measures  
What is your overall attitude about preserving the National Wetlands (preserving 
the habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions? 
Negative  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
Unacceptable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
Foolish  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right  






How important is the issue of preserving the National Wetlands (preserving the 
habitats of fish and wildlife in coastal wetlands regions? 
Unimportant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7    Important 
Of no concern  1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Of much 
concern 
Means nothing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Matters to me 
Insignificant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Significant 
Irrelevant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Phase Two 
Please read the following message before proceeding to the next session.   
Beware of Groups that Seek to Mislead 
As a responsible citizen, you have probably drawn some conclusions about 
issues such as how best to preserve America’s wetlands, how to keep our 
communities clean by reducing litter, and how to achieve energy independence 
without damaging the environment. Controversial issues have prompted politicians, 
businesses, and interest groups to encourage the public to side with them. Engaging 
in informed debates is part of the democratic process and everyone has a right to 
weigh in on the issues. 
Knowing their positions are unpopular with mainstream Americans, some 




organizations create front groups, which are groups with names that suggest values 
that most people can embrace, but are actually working to undermine the very 
ideals associated with names. They have perfected the art of deceptive messages 
that discourage listeners from scrutinizing the real goals of the group. Research 
confirms their efforts are quite persuasive and as a result, they may cause even you 
to rethink your positions based on deceptive information.  
Keep America Beautiful (KAB), is one such front group. Most people 
would think KAB was an organization that represents their values. In reality, KAB, 
funded largely by tobacco companies, launched campaigns around the country 
promoting individual responsibility for litter removal while simultaneously 
derailing any regulations that would force corporations to make environmentally 
friendly products and packaging. Clearly, we need to do our part, however 
corporations should also do their part creating more environmentally friendly 
products and packaging. KAB arguments are so compelling that without careful 
scrutiny of their message, they can win over people just like you, therefore their 
messages have an enormous impact on public opinion about cigarette and other 
litter control and removal. Their message sounds positive, but it leaves you on the 
hook to pay for and to clean up the environment, while tobacco companies do 
nothing.  
Front groups deceive many people but if you understand their tactics, you 




1. Front groups try to excuse corporations from their responsibility to 
make safe products. They do this by emphasizing that individuals, not 
corporations should assume responsibility for the negative effects of their 
products.  
2. Front groups select names that sound positive, but are misleading. It 
is easy to assume that a group with the name “Keep America Beautiful,” 
would pursue all options to keep communities beautiful. However, they should 
be called “Keep America Beautiful as Long as It Doesn’t Require Corporate 
Change.”  
3. Front groups use arguments that sound good, but are vague and 
often unclear. Sometimes statements are misleading because of what they omit 
who exactly funds them.  
It is likely that you will encounter a front group like Keep American 
Beautiful. If so, go on-line to find out what you can about the group and its 
sponsor. Evaluate the merits of the position in the message and the name of the 
group. You may find that the sponsor’s name and the arguments are at cross-
purposes with one another.  
Message Recall  
Please take as much time as you need to identify all the information you can about 







The next section is designed to help us understand how you feel about the idea that 
DESPITE YOUR OPINION ON mandatory bottle and can recycling legislation, 
THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY YOU MAY COME IN TO CONTACT WITH 
ARGUMENTS CONTRARY TO YOUR POSITION THAT ARE SO 
PERSUASIVE THAT THEY MAY CAUSE YOU TO RETIHINK YOUR 
POSITION.  I find THIS POSSIBILITY to be:  
1.  Not dangerous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dangerous 
2.  Non-threatening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Threatening 
3.  Calm  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anxious 
4.  Not scary  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Scary 
5.  Not harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmful 
6.  Not risky  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risky 
Anger Measures  
This section is designed to help us understand how you feel about the idea that 
DESPITE YOUR OPINION ON mandatory bottle and can recycling legislation, 
THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY YOU MAY be targeted by a font-group dedicated 
to deceiving you into RETIHINKING YOUR POSITION. 
1.  I feel angry that a front group would try to deceive me.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Strongly agree 
2.  I feel irritated that a front group would try to deceive me.   




3.  I feel annoyed that a front group would try to deceive me. 
Strongly disagree   1 2 3 4  5 6 7  Strongly agree 
4.  I feel aggravated that a front group would try to deceive me.   
Strongly disagree   1 2 3 4  5 6 7  Strongly agree. 
Counterarguing Measures 
Think about the issue mandatory bottle and can recycling legislation.  On 
the left side, write down any arguments that you can think of AGAINST your 
position ISSUE.  On the right side, list your responses (thoughts and feelings) to 
each of the arguments (from the left side). 
Think about the issue of mandatory recycling legislation. Write down 
arguments you think you might hear that will challenge your position about 
mandatory recycling.  Write down arguments you would make in response to the 
challenges you just listed.  Now that you have written down arguments on both 
sides of this issue, please rate the quality of each argument on a scale of 1 (meaning 
a very poor quality argument) and a 7 (meaning a very strong argument).   
Cognitive Response Measures 
You will now have three minutes to write down all your thoughts about front 
groups and front group tactics. (The responses will be coded for relevance and 
categorized as attribute related or as source related).   
Sufficiency Principle Measures 
Please indicate how confident you are in your ability to identify front group stealth 




Not at all confident  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 Very confident  
Please indicate how confident you would like to be in your ability identify front 
groups stealth messages if you encounter them.   
Not at all confident 1 2  3  4  5  6  7 Very confident 
Phase Three 
Booster Motivational Booster 
 Many people make decisions based on faulty, incomplete information, or 
even deceptive information.  As a result, many people make poor decisions.  These 
poor decisions lead consumers to purchase products that are useless or even worse, 
dangerous.  Other times it leads them to elect politicians they think will represent 
them, but who don’t actually support their views on the issues.  You don’t have to 
make poor decisions.  One of the best ways to avoid making errors and drawing on 
faulty conclusions about information is to think carefully about the information that 
you read.  At the end of this survey, you will be asked about the types of 
information you used to draw your conclusion about the information. 
Sufficiency Principle Measures 
Please indicate how confident you are in your ability to identify front group stealth 
messages if you encountered them. 
Not at all confident  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 Very confident  
Please indicate how confident you would like to be in your ability identify front 
groups stealth messages if you encounter them.   





Please indicate to what extent it is important to you to accurately identify a front 
group. 
Not at all important  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Important  
Please indicate to what extent is it relevant to you to know if a message you hear or 
read is from a front group. 
Very relevant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all relevant  
Please indicate to what extent does it matter to you that you are able to identify 
front groups when you encounter them?  
Does not matter   1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Matters a lot  
Keep American Beautiful Attack Message  
Please read the following message before proceeding to the next session.   
Keep America Beautiful® Kicks Off National Great American Cleanup™  
The Great STAMFORD, Conn. - Keep America Beautiful's Great American 
Cleanup mobilizes millions of volunteers each spring to clean, beautify and 
improve their communities - will kickoff nationally at the Times Square Visitors 
Center with the City of New York being honored for improving the quality of life 
of New Yorkers. American Cleanup, the nation's largest annual community based 
improvement program, is Keep America Beautiful's signature event. More than 2.3 
million people will be volunteering 7 million hours to improve more than 15,000 
communities during 30,000 events. Volunteers can take part in planned local 




"The 20th anniversary of our Great American Cleanup marks a milestone 
for creating and maintaining clean communities as volunteers rally together to 
eliminate litter, graffiti and blight that plague local environments. By showing their 
commitment through hands-on activities, volunteers provide individual solutions to 
sustaining a healthy quality of life for everyone," said G. Raymond Stanley, 
president of Keep America Beautiful. The organization stresses individual 
responsibility rather than corporate responsibility for proper disposal and clean-up 
efforts. “Let’s stop blaming businesses and start taking personal responsibility to 
improve our environment,” said Stanley. 
KAB's stated mission is to "empower individuals to take greater 
responsibility for enhancing their local community environment." KAB believes 
that if individuals take responsibility for disposing their wrappers, packaging, and 
garbage, the need for restrictive regulations on business will be reduced.  
The Keep American Beautiful organization believes individuals are 
responsible for improving their community environments, eliminating the need for 
burdensome and intrusive government intervention and restrictive policies on 
business to change their products and packaging. Our Guiding principles include 
promoting individual responsibility, environmental education, community 
partnerships (government, business, civic), and promoting volunteerism. 
Keep American Beautiful provides sustainable solutions to improve 
physical and visual aspects of community environments so individuals can directly 




Attitude Reassessment Measures 
Here are several statements about three issues.  For each statement, please circle the 
number that best expresses your level of agreement with the statement.   
 
1.  Overall attitude toward mandatory bottle and can recycling legislation. 
 
Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Positive 
Bad   1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Good 
Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable 
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise 
Wrong  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Right 
Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable 
2.  How important is the issue of mandatory bottle and can recycling 
legislation? 
Unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     Important 
Of no concern    1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Of much concern 
Means nothing    1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Means a lot 
Doesn’t matter    1 2 3 4 5 6 7   Matters to me 
Insignificant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Significant 
Irrelevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Relevant 
Anger Measures 
Here are several statements about Keep America Beautiful.  For each statement, 
please circle the number that best expresses your level of agreement with the 




4.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by Keep America Beautiful, I 
feel angry.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7   Strongly agree 
5.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by Keep America Beautiful, I 
feel irritated.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3  4 5 6 7   Strongly agree 
6.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by Keep America Beautiful, I 
feel annoyed. 
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7   Strongly agree 
7.  After reading the Public Relations brief released by Keep America Beautiful, I 
feel aggravated.   
Strongly disagree  1 2 3 4  5 6 7   Strongly agree 
Front Group Source Credibility Measures 
Here are several statements about Keep America Beautiful.  For each statement, 
please circle the number that best expresses your level of agreement with the 
statement.   
Keep America Beautiful is 
Reliable          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unreliable 
Uniformed      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     informed 
Unqualified    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     qualified 
Intelligent       1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unintelligent 
Valuable         1     2     3     4     5     6     7     worthless 
Inexpert           1     2     3     4     5     6     7     expert 




Unfriendly      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     friendly 
Pleasant          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unpleasant  
Selfish            1     2     3     4     5     6     7     unselfish  
Awful             1     2     3     4     5     6     7     nice 
Virtuous          1     2     3     4     5     6     7     sinful 
Cares about me      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Doesn’t care about me 
Has my interest at heart      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     doesn’t have my interests at heart 
Focused only on themselves and the companies they serve 
      1     2     3     4     5     6     7      
Not only focused on themselves and the companies they serve 
Unconcerned with me       1     2     3     4     5     6     7     concerned with me 
Insensitive                         1     2     3     4     5     6     7     sensitive  
Empathetic                        1     2     3     4     5     6     7     apathetic  
Understanding                   1     2     3     4     5     6     7     not understanding  
Unresponsive                    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     responsive  
Understands how I feel     1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Doesn’t understand how I feel 
Doesn’t understand how I think      1     2     3     4     5     6     7      understand how I think  
Cognitive Response Measures 
You will now have three minutes to write down all your thoughts about the 
message you just read. (The responses will be coded for relevance and categorized 
as attribute related or as source related).  
Accuracy in Front Group Identification 
 Is Keep America Beautiful a front group? 




How confident are you that you made the correct judgment that Keep America 
Beautiful is a front group? 
Not at all confident   1       100    Completely confident  
If you answered No, please continue to the next question.  
You have indicated that the Keep American Beautiful is a front group.  Please 
highlight portions of the NWC message that leads you to believe they are a front 
group.  
Now that you have highlighted portions of the Keep America Beautiful message, 
please explain why you believe the highlighted portion of the message provides a 
clue that the NWC is a front group.  
Perceived Deceptiveness Measures  
Please evaluate the truthfulness of the message presented by Keep America 
Beautiful.   
Completely Deceptive 1     2 3 4 5 6 7    Completely Truthful  
Unintended Inoculation Effects: Grassroots or Astroturf Measures 
In this section you will be asked to determine whether the groups below are 
comprised of grassroots organizations or front groups.   
Family Research Council 
Since 1983, Family Research Council (FRC) has advanced faith, family and 
freedom in public policy and public opinion.  FRC's team of seasoned experts 
promotes these core values through policy research, public education on Capitol 




with policymakers, publish books and pamphlets, build coalitions, testify before 
Congress, and maintain a powerful presence in print and broadcast media.  Through 
our outreach to pastors, we equip churches to transform the culture. 
26.  Is the Family Research Council a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 
27.  How confident are you that you that the Family Research Council is a front 
group? 
28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Family 
Research Council is a front group or why you determined that it was not a front 
group.  
The Sierra Club 
Since 1892, the Sierra Club has been working to protect communities, wild 
places, and the planet itself.  We are the largest and most influential grassroots 
environmental organization in the United States.  And our founder, John Muir, 
appears on the back of the California quarter. 
26.  Is the Sierra Club a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 
27.  How confident are you that you that the Sierra Club is a front group? 
28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Sierra Club is 
a front group or why you determined that it was not a front group.  
Center for Consumer Freedom 




organization devoted to promoting personal responsibility and protecting 
consumer choices.  We believe that the consumer is King.  And Queen.  A 
growing cabal of activists has meddled in Americans’ lives in recent years.  
They include self-anointed "food police," health campaigners, trial lawyers, 
personal-finance do-gooders, animal-rights misanthropes, and meddling 
bureaucrats.  Their common denominator? They all claim to know "what's best 
for you." In reality, they’re eroding our basic freedoms—the freedom to buy 
what we want, eat what we want, drink what we want, and raise our children as 
we see fit.  When they push ordinary Americans around, we're here to push 
back. 
26.  Is the Center for Consumer Freedom a front group? 
 Yes ______  No _______ 
27.  How confident are you that you that the Center for Consumer Freedom is a 
front group? 
28.  In the space bellow, please explain why you determined that the Center for 
Consumer Freedom is a front group or why you determined that it was not a front 
group. 
